1.The purpose,significance and methods of the research

The core purpose of this research is to provide a systematic explanation for the phenomenon of weak institutions in international society.The main arguments of traditional international institution research can be summarized as follows:Institutions are intentionally designed by the international society to coordinate actions of all parties,and weak institutions are usually inefficient compared to strong institutions,weak institutions are the result of institution degradation or institutionalization,and preparation for the establishment of strong institutions.So,why there are so many weak institutions that are deliberately designed and executed for a long time in the international society?Why so many global governance issues which are dominated by weak institutions are continuing to advance,while issues dominated by strong institutions are in dilemmas?In other words,why weak institutions lead to strong governance?How they are established and lead to strong governance?

The explanations on the construction and functioning mechanism of weak institutions proposed in this study complement and revise traditional institution theories based on the“strong institution bias”.First,the constructing path of institutions with one-way interaction with subjects is revised,and weak institutions are the product of the balance of all parties' ideas in their two-way interactions.In the process of institution construction,actors with different preferences usually propose different institution designs.The institution finally established is the product of the fusion of ideas of all parties.The fusion is not necessarily achieved by the simple compromise of interests,but can also achieved by blurring the connotation and introducing conflicting rules.Second,the assertion that weak institutions will inevitably lead to inefficient governance is revised.Weak institutions can also achieve continuous cooperation and strong governance through the mechanism of actions that fit their own attributes.This view could ultimately provide theoretical support for the unfolding of the“third research agenda”—differences of the functioning mechanisms of various kinds of institutions.Third,research on the continuity of weak institutions complements the existing perspectives on institution evolution.Traditional research focuses on institution's evolution and degradation but ignores its continuity.It is also a theoretical problem worth pondering that how the institution can be continuous under environmental changes.

This research has three practical implications for current global governance.First,there is a tendency to construct weak institutions in various issues,such as climate change,cyber security and humanitarianism.Although academia realizes that weak institutions may have advantages that strong institutions do not have,they lack systematic analysis on how to design weak institutions and what results they will bring.This research can provide reference for the construction of weak institutions in the international society.Second,it provides a direction for the reform of institutions in global governance.The academia generally believes that the current institution of various issues needs to be changed,but their opinions on how to reform are different and lack of theoretical and practical basis.After discarding the inherent prejudice that weak institutions are inevitably inefficient,it can be used as a direction of future institution reform under the background of pluralistic governance.Third,it provides inspiration for emerging countries and weak countries participating in global governance.As these countries become more active in the international society,the traditional institution established by the West is increasingly showing its limitations.The logic of institution replacement embodied in strong institutions can easily lead to conflicts between old and new powers,while weak institutions provide a gradual reform path.Some elements of the old institution are included in the new institution,which reduces the fear of the existing power.At the same time,emerging powers and weak countries have chances to make their voices heard,by incorporating their ideas into the new institution.

When conducting theoretical construction and cases analysis,this research adopts a variety of methods flexibly in order to enhance the argument and ensure the rigorousness of the analysis.The dominant method is two complementary applications of four specific methods.The first is to combine process tracing with counterfactual reasoning,to explain abnormal phenomena while answering habitual phenomena,to ensure that every link in the causal chain is reliable.The second is the combination of historical analysis and explanatory analysis,which clarify the direct causes of related phenomena while find the possible root causes,ensuring the depth of the causal relationship revealed.

2.Main content and important viewpoints

The introduction mainly expounds the research problems and reviews the overall process of traditional international institution research,and points out the“strong institution bias”existing in traditional theory,which has led to neglect of the weak institution for a long time.The relevant arguments based on the analysis of strong institutions have a series of fallacies when applied to weak institutions.With the proposing of issues on institution design and institution types and the advancement of research on soft law and regime complex,the pursuing of a single comprehensive institution has been abandoned,laying a foundation for the analysis of weak institutions.This part also introduces the case design,research ideas and methods.

Chapter 1 discusses the current international environment and what weak institutions and strong governance are.This chapter proposes relevant indicators to define the strength of institution and governance,and provides road maps for assessing progress on various global governance issues.At the same time,it also focuses on expounding the external environment in which weak institutions are designed and its leading to strong governance.The rise of multi-civilizations accompanied by power shift and the“decentralization”of the global governance have posed challenges to the existing strong institutions.It has become an urgent issue to seek institution types that fit the current environment.It is in this heterogeneous environment of balance of power that weak institutions show relatively stronger effectiveness.

Chapter 2 explains the design process of weak institutions,and defines weak institutions as the product of balance of ideas.By distinguishing homogeneity and heterogeneity,single rational egoism and compound rationality,single identity and limited identity,three hypotheses are proposed as the foundation of theoretical construction,which are heterogeneity,compound rational egoism and limited identity.In the heterogeneous environment of balance of power,differences in background knowledge lead actors to have different perceptions to issues.Based on rationality and self-interest,all parties want to build institutions according to their own preferences,resulting in fierce initiatives competition.Under the situation of increasing issue pressure,all parties have a sense of urgency to complete the institution construction and take action as soon as possible,and try to take into account the preferences of different actors by blurring the connotation of clauses,introducing conflicting rules,and avoiding punitive coercion,thus establishing a weak institution.

Chapter 3 explains how weak institutions lead to strong governance.Weak institutions have acquired obvious flexibility,adaptability,and inclusiveness based on relevant designs,and thus have six capabilities,such as providing a wide range of interests adjustment space.These attributes and capabilities lay the foundation of cooperation.Weak institutions facilitate the emergence of strong governance through three mechanisms:First,by acknowledging multiple appropriateness,it provides an ambiguous range of appropriateness,and reassigns actors the right to judge the appropriateness of actions.Second,through the mutual pressuring,actors are urged to assume certain responsibilities,which depend on the balance between actors' own preferences and international expectations.Third,by providing additional incentives,such as additional reputation,to induce actors to actively perform contracts.Under the guidance of weak institutions,governance shows a trend of dynamic strengthening.By lowering the“threshold”for cooperation,governance is ensured to start quickly,allowing all parties to act as quickly as possible to address pressing issues.With the growth of issue pressure and the emergence of reputation competition,the expectations of actors will increase cumulatively,and governance will accelerate.

Chapters 4,5,and 6 analyze the process of global climate governance.Chapter 4 expounds the climate governance issue itself,institution and governance progress,including the analysis of the rise of climate issues and its related attributes,the analysis of the governance institution based on relevant institutional documents,and the definition of the overall governance progress according to relevant indicators.The institution system of global climate governance is mainly established on the basis of three documents,the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,the Kyoto Protocoland the Paris Agreement.On the whole,it has experienced an evolution process from weak to strong and then weakened again.The change in governance is just the opposite.After entering the“Kyoto period”,it did not significantly increase with the establishment of the mandatory emission reduction mechanism,but entered a low ebb.As institution weakened again in the“post-Kyoto period”,countries' participation instead became more active.

Chapter 5 analyzes the governance dilemma in the process of strengthening the climate governance institution during the“Kyoto Period”,and clarifies how the strengthening of the institution led to the resistance of the parties with multiple preferences.Institution strengthening has intensified the debate on the distribution of responsibilities between developed and developing countries,leading to a serious“collective action dilemma”.In particular,“umbrella countries”such as the United States and Japan are increasingly dissatisfied with the institution.The split of the institution's executive bodies makes it difficult for the coercive mechanism to operate,and the incentive mechanism is also difficult to induce countries to perform because of its non-equilibrium.

Chapter 6 analyzes the progress of governance after the re-weakening of the institution in the“post-Kyoto period”,and clarifies how the weak institution mobilized their enthusiasm for participating in governance by taking into account the preferences of all parties.The intended nationally determined contributions model takes into account the preferences of all parties by means of blurring the definition of responsibilities,thus all parties actively participate in the governance.Countries have actively assumed certain responsibilities while ensuring their own interests.As the issue pressure rises and major powers compete for leadership in governance,there is a tendency for actors to compete for compliance in climate governance.

Chapter 7 draws conclusions based on theoretical and empirical discussions,and reflects on the“institutional dilemma”in current global governance and the future reform of institutions.There is no judgement of good or bad for strong institution and weak institution,they follow different“institution-cooperation”logic,both can be optimal designs in a given situation.In the heterogeneous environment of balance of power,weak institutions have relatively higher effectiveness.They mobilize the enthusiasm of all parties to participate in governance by taking into account multiple demands,and generate a dynamically enhanced governance process through mechanisms such as mutual pressuring and additional incentives.Based on the above conclusions,the current“institutional dilemma”can be redefined as a contradiction between the preference for building a single,comprehensive institution and the difficulty in constructing and operating this type of institution in the context of multi-civilizations.Future institution reform will mainly focus on how to transform those strong institutions that only reflect western preferences into institutions that reflect the demands of diverse civilizations,and weak institutions conform to this trend.Finally,it analyzes how China defines its role as the most critical actor in the process of future institution reform.Weak institutions make it possible for China to incorporate its own preferences into international institutions while effectively avoiding the resistance of existing great powers.

3.Academic innovation and contributions

This research has made following progresses.First,a new institution research perspective is proposed.Traditional research is influenced by“Eurocentrism bias”and“strong institution bias”,ignoring weak institutions.This has led to a series of misdiagnoses of modern international relations and hindered the understanding of interdependence and pluralism.Systematic analysis of weak institutions helps to revise existing research.There is no better or worse between strong and weak institutions in promoting cooperation,and both can produce strong governance in suitable situations.Second,it proposes an idea of bridging global governance research and institutional theoretical research.The academia has noticed that global governance and institutions are intrinsically linked.In essence,global governance is to coordinate the governance carried out by all parties around the world through institutions,and various issue areas constitute a“laboratory”for institution research.However,there have been few attempts to improve institution theory through global governance research.It is helpful to improve the general assertion of institution research by illustrating the frequently occurring phenomena in global governance.Third,the method of analytical eclecticism is applied to the study of institutions,that is,the formation and functioning mechanism of weak institutions are explained by using both arguments of rationalism and constructivism.As a result of the balance of ideas,weak institutions are caused by the differences in preferences of actors and roughly balanced power,and the compliance of actors is the result of the combined effect of“consequential logic”and“appropriateness logic”.

The academic contributions of this research are mainly reflected in the following three aspects：

First,it clarifies the main problems existing in the current institution research and the direction of improvement.The analysis of weak institutions is part of the research on how different types of institutions function,and it is also the latest agenda of institution research.After the issue of the type of institution was raised,the academia has increasingly focused on discussing the external form of the institution（such as membership,etc.）,but has never touched the difference of their nature.These superficial researches reflect academia's deliberate evasion to a key question—is the view correct that established institution theories can be applied to all types of institutions?If the answer is yes,why there are so many unexplained phenomena?Why academia has been paying attention to the types of institution?If not,what types of institutions they are suitable to explain?And how should new institution theories be constructed?Existing theories are established by analyzing strong institutions,and assertions including institution construction and functioning mechanisms are not applicable to weak institutions.Instead,we need to construct corresponding theories based on empirical facts.

Second,it provides a specific path for constructing non-Western international relations theories（IRTs）.In recent years,with the nonWestern emerging countries rising as a group,the limitations of Western IRTs are constantly emerging,and the voices of constructing non-Western IRTs are getting louder.However,there are few achievements in the“landing”of ideas or the construction of specific theories.Among them,the opinions of emphasizing the voice and role of non-Western countries and the ideas of pluralistic governance and symbiosis are widely accepted.However,how to achieve symbiosis and pluralistic governance?Obviously,the strong institution emphasized by Western international institution theory and the monistic thought it embodies cannot do this.According to the idea of strong institution construction,one party forces the others to accept its propositions,it is impossible for an institution to emerge with a roughly balanced power of all parties,and the prospect of transforming Western countries by non-Western countries is also inconsistent with the goals of non-Western countries.So,what is the type of international institution that matches the idea of symbiosis?Weak institutions provide a focal point for the construction of non-Western IRTs.

Finally,it provides specific policy options for China to formulate a“China Plan”to participate in and lead the reform of the global governance institution.The current“institutional dilemma”faced by global governance provides a good opportunity for China to play a leading role,and China can incorporate its own preferences into the new institution in the process of leading institution reform.However,China also needs to avoid the suspicions of existing powers about the construction of new institutions.By taking into account multiple demands,the weak institution provides a route for China to gradually reform the global governance institution.

Key Words: Global Governance;Weak Institutions;Strong Governance;Climate Change;Institutional Dilemma