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地方财政支出结构偏向的政治经济学研究

ISBN:978-7-5161-5258-4

出版日期:2014-12

页数:179

字数:190.0千字

点击量:9230次

定价:35.00元

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近年来,为增长而竞争的最大代价莫过于财政分权过程中地方公共物品供给效率的下降。为了追求任期内的“政绩最大化”,地方官员在财政支出安排方面表现出不同的关注,其行为取向通过财政支出结构就能得到最为直接且客观的体现。更令人担忧的是,实行分税制以来,地方财政支出结构一直处于系统性偏向,而且这种偏向并没有随着经济发展和体制改革而出现修正的迹象,相反继续保持着僵化的锁定状态。很显然,这种偏向状态对地方经济的良性发展和体制转轨的不断推进带来了严重危害。本书主要从乘数效应、挤出效应和马太效应三个维度刻画财政支出结构偏向对宏观经济所造成的消极影响。基于以上认识,本书试图通过理论分析与实证研究来寻求造成地方财政支出结构偏向的原因。从宏观上说,我们研究的是中国式财政联邦主义所带来的分权成本;从微观上说,我们要做的工作是从内生性的角度去理解形成财政支出结构的内在机理。一方面,基于新古典经济学的研究视角,利用理论模型的分析使我们更加理解了财政竞争背后的经济机制和理论本质,从而厘清财政竞争和公共支出结构之间的内在联系。通过计量模型的实证检验发现,虽然目前我国不完善的转移支付制度和户籍制度在不同程度上影响了财政竞争的有效实施,从而导致公共支出结构的偏向,但是在长期中财政竞争对于改善公共支出结构是动态有效的。另一方面,从新政治经济学的视角出发,我们发现在中国式标尺竞争的推动下,地方官员自利行为是财政支出结构偏向的直接诱因:私人理性的放大造成了财政支出结构的偏向,公共理性的丧失导致了财政支出结构偏向的固化。如果把标尺竞争所带来的消极后果更一般化地理解,那么研究对象就是政府治理问题。通过论证,我们发现公共支出结构是由政府治理质量内生所决定的,而且政府治理、财政支出结构与经济增长三者之间存在着内在联系。为了进一步改善地方政府的财政支出结构,我们必须从四个方面进行优化治理。首先,促进地方政府间财政竞争的有效实施。财政竞争的低效根源于现实的制度缺失。所以,如果能够进一步改革户籍制度使辖区间人口充分流动,那么有效的财政竞争就能使财政支出结构效率得到改进。其次,如果中央加大专项转移支付,就可以弥补地方政府财政支出结构的缺陷,从而保证公民享有最低公共服务。再次,改善地方政府的治理质量。我国已经由生存型社会向发展型社会转变,所以,一方面,政府必须充分重视人的全面发展,密切关注和满足社会成员的各种基本公共需求。为此,就需要政府转变治理模式,快速实现向公共服务型政府的转型,建立以公民为中心的地方治理;另一方面,中央也必须通过改进与完善晋升锦标赛机制才能真正实现地方官员的激励转型。最后,健全地方公共支出的监管机制。由于公共支出过程中经常出现信息不完全和信息不对称,由此造成委托—代理关系的存在。为了防止代理人的逆向选择与道德风险,有效的财政监督机制和增加信息披露的财政透明制度是实现财政公开、建立公共财政的有效途径。本书共分七章。第一章对本书的研究对象进行界定,就相关的国内外经典文献进行评述,提出了本书的研究方法和具体思路。第二章对1997—2009年地方财政支出结构进行了统计分析。第三章从乘数效应、挤出效应和马太效应三个维度来刻画财政支出结构偏向对宏观经济所造成的消极影响。第四章基于新古典经济学的研究视角,利用理论模型的分析使我们更加理解了财政竞争背后的经济机制和理论本质,厘清了财政竞争和公共支出结构之间的内在联系。第五章从新政治经济学视角出发,我们发现在中国式标尺竞争的推动下,地方官员自利行为是财政支出结构偏向的直接诱因,从更一般化的理论分析,论证了公共支出结构是由政府治理质量内生所决定的。第六章从促进地方政府间财政竞争、改善地方政府的治理质量和健全地方公共支出的监管机制三个方面来研究优化地方财政支出结构的治理机制。第七章结合前面相关的理论和实证的研究结果,对优化地方财政支出结构和改善地方政府治理质量提出若干政策建议。关键词:财政支出结构偏向 财政竞争 标尺竞争 地方政府治理

In recent years, competition for growth of the biggest price than the fiscal decentralization in the course of the decline of the efficiency of local public goods supply. In order to pursue the term“growth maximization”, local officials in financial expenditure arrangements exhibit different attention, its behavior through fiscal expenditure structure can be the most direct and objective embodiment. Much more worrying is that, since the tax sharing system, the structure of local fiscal expenditure has been a systematic bias, and this bias is not with economic development and system reform and the correct sign, instead continue to maintain a rigid locking state. Obviously, this bias state on the local economic development and system reform steadily brought serious harm. This article mainly from the multiplier effect, crowding-out effect and Matthew effect in three dimensions depict the fiscal expenditure structure bias to macroscopical economy caused by the negative impact.Based on the above understanding, this article attempts through theoretical analysis and empirical research to seek the cause of local fiscal expenditure structure deviation reasons. From the macro point of view, we study the Chinese fiscal federalism bring decentralization cost; but, from microcosmic on, what we want to do is from internal point of view to understand the formation of the internal mechanism of fiscal expenditure structure. On one hand, based on the new classical economics perspective, using the theoretical model analysis makes us understand the financial competition behind the economic mechanism and theory of essence in order to clarify the financial competition and the intrinsic link between the structure of public expenditure. Through the measurement model of the empirical test, we find that, although in the present our country did not improve the transfer payment system and the household registration system in the different extent influence fiscal competition effectively thereby causing the public expenditure structure bias, but in the long run fiscal competition for the improvement of the structure of public expenditure is dynamic and effective. On the other hand, from the perspective of new political economics in China, we find that type of yardstick competition drive below, local officials self-interest behavior is the direct cause of fiscal expenditure structure bias: private rational amplification caused the fiscal expenditure structure bias, public rationality loss led to the fiscal expenditure structure bias curing. If the yardstick competition the negative consequences of more general understanding, so the research object is the government governance. Through the argumentation, we found that the structure of public expenditure by the government governance quality endogenously determined, and the government management, the structure of fiscal expenditure and economic growth between the three inner relations.In order to further improve the local government fiscal expenditure structure, we must from the three aspects of optimizing management. First of all, the promotion of local government fiscal competition among the effective implementation. The causes of low efficiency of fiscal competition on the reality of the lack of system. So, if we can further the reform of census register system to administer interval population to flow, then the effective financial competition can make the structure of fiscal expenditure efficiency to be improved. In addition, if the central increase special transfer payment can make up local government fiscal expenditure structure, so as to ensure that the citizens enjoy the lowest public service. Secondly, to improve the quality of management of local government. Our country already from survival type society to the development of society, therefore, on one hand the government must pay full attention to the all-round development of people, pay close attention to and meet the social member’s basic public demand, therefore, it needs the government change management mode, quick to public service oriented government transformation, to build a citizen as the center of the local governance; on the other hand, central also must pass through the improvement and perfection of Promotion Tournament mechanism in order to realize the local officers transformation. Finally, the perfect local public expenditure supervision mechanism. As a result of public expenditure often appears in the process of incomplete information and asymmetric information, the resulting principal-agent relationship exists. In order to prevent the agent’s adverse selection and moral risk, effective financial supervision mechanism and increase the financial transparency information disclosure system is the realization of open finance the establishment of public finance is an effective way to.This book consists of seven chapters. The first chapter, the subjects in the study were defined, and the related domestic and foreign classical literature review. Put forward the research methods and specific train of thought. The second chapter is the local fiscal expenditure structure bias on 1997-2009 investigation, local fiscal expenditure structure are analyzed. The third chapter, mainly from the multiplier effect, crowding-out effect and Matthew effect in three dimensions to describe the structure of fiscal expenditure bias to macroscopical economy caused by the negative impact. The fourth chapter is based on the research of new classical economics perspective, using the theoretical model analysis makes us understand the financial competition behind the economic mechanism and theory of essence in order to clarify the financial competition and the intrinsic link between the structure of public expenditure. The fifth chapter from the new political economics perspective, we found in Chinese type yardstick competition drive below, local officials self-interest behavior is the direct cause of fiscal expenditure structure bias, then from a more general theoretical analysis, discusses the structure of public expenditure by the government is endogenously determined by the quality of governance. The sixth chapter from promoting fiscal competition among local governments, improving local government management and improve the quality of local public expenditure supervision mechanism to study three aspects of optimization of structure of local fiscal expenditure management mechanism. The seventh chapter combining the relevant theories and empirical results, the optimization of structure of local fiscal expenditure and improve local government governance quality and puts forward some policy suggestions.Key Words:The fiscal expenditure structure bias, Fiscal competition, Yardstick competition, The governance of local government

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引文

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GB/T 7714-2015 格式引文
郑尚植.地方财政支出结构偏向的政治经济学研究[M].北京:中国社会科学出版社,2014
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MLA 格式引文
郑尚植.地方财政支出结构偏向的政治经济学研究.北京,中国社会科学出版社:2014E-book.
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APA 格式引文
郑尚植(2014).地方财政支出结构偏向的政治经济学研究.北京:中国社会科学出版社
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