从宏观经济角度看，改革开放30多年来，中国通过渐进式改革逐步从计划经济步入市场经济的发展模式，但是在金融行业市场化改革的发展还在进行中。中国的金融业目前仍然是一个政府主导型行业，中国政府对于金融业的控制是强有力的，具体体现在商业银行的国有控股性质、存款基准利率央行统一制定、信贷规模的控制等诸多方面。尽管金融自由化一直受到争议，国家出于金融安全及政治稳定等因素的考虑必须对金融业施行必要的管制。但不可否认的是，金融市场化在调节资源配置、提高经济效率等方面发挥着巨大的作用。因此，稳步推进金融市场化发展对我国的经济发展有着重要的实践意义。从银行业发展的微观角度看，中国企业的融资手段依然以商业银行贷款的间接融资为主，在这样的背景下加强银行业的风险监管对我国的意义尤为重要。中国银监会对银行的监管一直以《巴塞尔协议》为蓝本依托，制定符合中国国情的监管制度。而《巴塞尔协议》的三大监管支柱为：（1）最低资本充足要求；（2）监管当局监管；（3）市场约束监管。所谓市场约束，即是指发挥市场力量对银行业的风险行为构成约束，形成一种以市场为导向的监管机制风险控制概念。可见，市场约束是集合市场经济和监管机制的风险控制概念。作为《巴塞尔协议》银行监管的第三大支柱，市场约束在商业银行监管中发挥着不可替代的作用。本书旨在运用从总体到细节的分析框架与方法，并结合金融学分支以及数学的重要原理，同时利用计量方法和翔实的数据对中国商业银行的市场约束情况进行理论分析和实证研究。在理论方面，建立综合考察市场约束主要主体——存款人、债权人、股东的激励机制以及商业银行对市场约束的博弈反应等模型；在实证方面，结合中国上市商业银行的实际数据进行逐一分析，进而研究市场约束如何发挥其对商业银行监管的主要规律和作用机制，并结合中国实际，探求市场约束在我国的发展情况。通过以上分析论述得出关于如何通过市场约束促进商业银行监管的结论，并对中国的银行业监管发展进行展望。本书研究内容共分八章。第一章介绍问题提出的背景、研究思路、方法、特点，以及创新点及难点。第二章回顾了市场约束及其相关内容的重要文献，并从整体上阐述了市场约束的作用机制。详细论述了市场约束的历史、发挥作用的一般原理、市场约束的内涵及主体（存款人、次级债投资人、股东等）。在文献综述的同时简要地分析了市场约束的条件及发展，也分析了市场约束与其他监管支柱的联系。从第三章开始，具体分析市场约束主体在中国的实际情况。第三章从存款人的角度对市场约束作用的发挥进行论述。理论部分介绍了存款人发挥市场约束作用的机理及重要意义。实证部分就我国的存款市场进行了统计性描述及市场约束的计量分析。第四章从次级债投资人的角度对市场约束进行了论述。应用资产定价的原理，用数学模型推导了次级债投资人如何发挥市场约束作用，并就商业银行引入次级债后会引起其他利益相关人的变化进行了分析。通过建立数学模型和数值模拟就我国次级债市场等问题的特殊性进行了分析。还就我国商业银行次级债发展的特有现象——“相互持有”的角度对市场约束的影响进行了分析。第五章从股东在股市进行交易的角度，对我国上市商业银行的市场约束进行了分析。本章论述了股东市场约束的内涵、意义，分析了我国商业银行股东的市场约束存在的途径。实证部分用GMM动态面板分析了基于股票交易的角度对商业银行风险的市场约束。实证结果显示，股票市场交易的非系统性波动对商业银行的风险管理构成了市场约束。第六章主要论述了市场约束受到周围环境怎样的影响，以及面对市场约束，商业银行会进行哪些相应的博弈。论述了信息披露与市场约束的关系；如果存在市场约束，或者市场约束预期，商业银行会做出盈余管理、资本管理、流动性管理、监管资本套利等博弈及外部环境对市场约束的影响。第七章总结了市场约束在我国的发展情况，对如何在我国践行市场约束等问题进行了分析。第八章为研究的总结论和未来的研究方向。通过理论和实证分析，本书得出如下结论：第一，市场约束在商业银行监管问题上发挥着不可替代的作用。第二，中国商业银行的市场约束机制还很薄弱，尤其表现在存款人及次级债投资人上。第三，面对市场约束，商业银行会做出盈余管理、资本管理等博弈反应。市场约束总体上促进了《巴塞尔协议》的另外两大监管支柱。第四，市场约束的发展在我国银行业是必要且重要的，因此应加强我国商业银行的市场约束监管，这对我国商业银行乃至金融业的健康发展具有重要意义。在本书的写作过程中，笔者感谢东北财经大学邢天才教授、南开大学赵胜民教授、中国人民大学王孝松副教授、复旦大学许友传老师、中央财经大学方意老师、东北大学张永超老师、天津财经大学张瑜老师、《股市动态分析》主编赵迪先生等学者给出的建议。教学相长，感谢我的学生们给予的灵感和帮助。当然，更感谢父母给予的无限支持和关爱。这些都是我在科研中继续前进的动力。翟光宇2014年7月26日于东北财经大学

From a macroeconomic point of view, over the past 30 years of reform and opening up, China has gradually moved from a planned economy to a market economy development model through gradual reforms, but the development of market-oriented reforms in the financial industry is still in progress. China's financial industry is still a government-led industry, and the Chinese government's control over the financial industry is strong, which is embodied in the state-controlled nature of commercial banks, the unified setting of deposit benchmark interest rates by the central bank, and the control of credit scale. Although financial liberalization has been controversial, the state must implement the necessary regulations on the financial sector for reasons of financial security and political stability. However, it is undeniable that financial marketization plays a huge role in regulating resource allocation and improving economic efficiency. Therefore, steadily promoting the development of financial market has important practical significance for China's economic development. From the micro perspective of the development of the banking industry, the financing means of Chinese enterprises are still mainly indirect financing of commercial bank loans, and it is of particular significance to China to strengthen the risk supervision of the banking industry in this context. The CBRC's supervision of banks has been modeled on the Basel Accord to formulate a regulatory regime that suits China's national conditions. The three regulatory pillars of the Basel Accord are: (1) minimum capital adequacy requirements; (2) supervision by regulatory authorities; (3) Market constraint supervision. The so-called market constraint refers to the exertion of market forces to constrain the risk behavior of the banking industry, forming a market-oriented regulatory mechanism risk control concept. It can be seen that market constraint is a risk control concept that integrates market economy and regulatory mechanism. As the third pillar of Basel banking supervision, market constraints play an irreplaceable role in commercial banking supervision. This book aims to use the analytical framework and methods from general to detail, combined with the important principles of finance and mathematics, and use quantitative methods and detailed data to conduct theoretical analysis and empirical research on the market constraints of Chinese commercial banks. In terms of theory, a comprehensive examination of the incentive mechanism of depositors, creditors and shareholders, and the game response of commercial banks to market constraints are established. In terms of empirical evidence, combined with the actual data of China's listed commercial banks, we will analyze one by one, and then study how market constraints can play their main laws and mechanisms of supervision over commercial banks, and explore the development of market constraints in China in combination with China's actual conditions. Through the above analysis, we draw conclusions on how to promote commercial banking supervision through market constraints, and look forward to the development of banking supervision in China. The study of this book is divided into eight chapters. The first chapter introduces the background, research ideas, methods, characteristics, innovation points and difficulties of the problem. Chapter 2 reviews the important literature on market constraints and their related content, and explains the mechanism of market constraints as a whole. The history of market constraints, the general principles of their functioning, the connotation and subjects of market constraints (depositors, subprime debt investors, shareholders, etc.) are discussed in detail. At the same time as the literature review, the conditions and development of market constraints are briefly analyzed, and the connection between market constraints and other regulatory pillars is analyzed. Starting from the third chapter, we will specifically analyze the actual situation of market constraints in China. Chapter 3 discusses the role of market restraint from the perspective of depositors. The theoretical part introduces the mechanism and significance of depositors playing a role in market constraints. The empirical part provides a statistical description of China's deposit market and a quantitative analysis of market constraints. Chapter 4 discusses market constraints from the perspective of subordinated debt investors. Applying the principle of asset pricing, mathematical models are used to derive how subordinated bond investors play a role of market constraint, and the changes of other stakeholders caused by the introduction of subordinated bonds by commercial banks are analyzed. Through the establishment of mathematical models and numerical simulations, the particularity of China's subprime bond market and other problems was analyzed. It also analyzes the impact of market constraints from the perspective of "mutual holding", a unique phenomenon in the development of subordinated bonds of commercial banks in China. Chapter 5 analyzes the market constraints of China's listed commercial banks from the perspective of shareholders' trading in the stock market. This chapter discusses the connotation and significance of shareholder market constraints, and analyzes the ways in which market constraints exist for shareholders of commercial banks in China. In the empirical part, the GMM dynamic panel was used to analyze the market constraints on the risk of commercial banks from the perspective of stock trading. Empirical results show that the unsystematic fluctuation of stock market transactions constitutes a market constraint on the risk management of commercial banks. Chapter 6 mainly discusses how market constraints are affected by the surrounding environment, and what corresponding games commercial banks will play in the face of market constraints. The relationship between information disclosure and market constraints is discussed. If there are market constraints, or market constraints are expected, commercial banks will make games such as surplus management, capital management, liquidity management, regulatory capital arbitrage and the impact of the external environment on market constraints. Chapter 7 summarizes the development of market constraints in China and analyzes how to implement market constraints in China. Chapter 8 contains the overall conclusions of the study and future research directions. Through theoretical and empirical analysis, this book concludes that first, market constraints play an irreplaceable role in the supervision of commercial banks. Second, the market restraint mechanism of Chinese commercial banks is still very weak, especially in depositors and subordinated debt investors. Third, in the face of market constraints, commercial banks will respond to games such as surplus management and capital management. Market constraints in general contribute to the other two regulatory pillars of the Basel Accord. Fourth, the development of market constraints is necessary and important in China's banking industry, so the market constraint supervision of China's commercial banks should be strengthened, which is of great significance to the healthy development of China's commercial banks and even the financial industry. In the process of writing this book, the author would like to thank Professor Xing Tiancai of Dongbei University of Finance and Economics, Professor Zhao Shengmin of Nankai University, Associate Professor Wang Xiaosong of Chinese Minmin University, Professor Xu Youchuan of Fudan University, Professor Fang Yi of Central University of Finance and Economics, Professor Zhang Yongchao of Northeastern University, Professor Zhang Yu of Tianjin University of Finance and Economics, and Mr. Zhao Di, Editor-in-Chief of "Stock Market Dynamic Analysis". I am grateful to my students for their inspiration and help. Of course, I am also grateful for the unlimited support and love given by my parents. These are my motivations to keep moving forward in research. Zhai Guangyu at Dongbei University of Finance and Economics on July 26, 2014（AI翻译）