本书是2009年教育部人文社会科学研究一般项目基金《我国农业保险政府补贴问题研究》（项目号：09YJA790059）的最终成果的主要内容，也是2011年河北省社会科学基金项目《我国农业巨灾风险管理制度创新研究》（项目号：HB2011QR43）的阶段性成果之一，同时受到了河北经贸大学学术出版基金的资助。本书出版旨在为我国农业保险补贴制度的完善提供些许资料参考。

农业保险是现代农业发展的三大支柱之一，是世贸组织允许各国支持农业的“绿箱政策”之一，对农业和国民经济发展具有强大的福利功效、信贷支持功效和政策功效。但由于农业风险具有不可保性，农业保险需求决定具有复杂性，农业保险供给面临严重的系统性风险和信息不对称问题，农业保险供求具有“双重正外部性”等特征，中外学术界基本上已经达成共识：农业保险是政策性险种，需要政府补贴以提高参与率，实现政府的政策目标。在农业保险实务中，美国、加拿大等国家对农业保险实施补贴政策已经多年。

2007年我国中央政府开始对农业保险进行保费补贴试点，揭开了农业保险快速发展的序幕。2007—2010年农业保险保费收入分别是51.84亿元、110.7亿元、133.9亿元和135.7亿元，分别是没有实施补贴政策的2006年的6.13倍、13.09倍、15.83倍和16.04倍。很显然，政府补贴是我国农业保险发展重要的助推器。

但同时，在我国农业保险补贴试点中涌现出很多问题：补贴缺乏立法规范，缺乏政策支持的稳定性和连续性；补贴规模连年增加，但与我国农业增加值及农业重要程度相比仍显不足；农业保险补贴范围狭窄，很多重要的农作物和养殖物还没有纳入补贴范围；补贴方式比较单一，只有保费补贴一种方式，经营管理费用补贴、再保险补贴和税收优惠等补贴方式还没有使用；保费补贴的比例较高，但补贴效率并不理想；农业保险补贴实践中投保人、保险人和基层政府的各种道德风险行为开始显现，导致补贴资金出现耗费现象；保费补贴的政府层级比较多，基层政府有限的财力成为农业保险补贴政策实施的重要瓶颈，等等。

本书拟以解决这些农业保险补贴问题为切入点，系统研究农业保险补贴“为什么补”、“补的作用是什么”、“如何补”、“补什么”、“补多少”、“补得效率如何”以及“怎样补得更好”等理论问题和实践问题。本书的主要观点和研究结论为：

第一，对于“为什么补贴农业保险”这个问题，本书从福利经济学、市场失灵理论、博弈论、农业保护理论和风险可保性理论等角度进行了分析，殊途同归，得出了相同的结论：农业保险是政策性险种，纯商业化经营难以为继，政府应该对农业保险进行补贴。

第二，对于“农业保险补贴的作用是什么”这个问题，本书认为，政府对农业保险进行补贴能产生刺激农业保险需求、激励农业保险供给、强化农民保险意识、促进社会福利及实现农业保护等功效。

第三，对于“如何补贴农业保险”这个问题，本书对美国、日本、菲律宾和法国的农业保险补贴立法进行比较研究，得出结论认为，农业保险补贴制度供给应以完善的农业保险立法为前提和基础，建立农业保险补贴的长效机制，防止农业保险补贴的不确定性和随意性。另外，本书还系统分析了农业保险补贴的六种方式，即资本金支持、保费补贴、经营管理费用补贴、再保险补贴、税收优惠和农业巨灾风险准备基金，并提出我国目前应首先采用哪些补贴方式。

第四，对于“农业保险补贴补什么”这个问题，本书比较研究了其他国家农业保险补贴的保险标的和保险责任，认为我国农业保险补贴范围比较狭窄，建议应该适当扩大财政补贴农业保险的品种范围，授予各省根据当地实际情况灵活确定补贴品种的权限，如参照浙江经验在种植业采取N（基本品种）+X（其他品种，各省可自选）的方式，以便将各地大面积种植、并对促进现代农业发展有重要意义的经济作物和设施蔬菜，对稳定人民菜篮子工程、增加农户收入具有重要意义的畜禽等纳入补贴范围。

第五，对于“农业保险补贴补多少”这个问题，本书认为，我国农业保险补贴标准或补贴比率（各级政府补贴数额占保费的比例）平均达80%甚至更高，已经达到了全球最高水平，没有进一步提高的空间。但是，由于我国的农业保险补贴范围狭窄，保障水平较低（仅保成本），因此尽管补贴比率很高，但是总的补贴规模并不大。按照美国农业保险补贴总额占农业GDP的比重为3.4%的经验比例测算，我国2010年农业保险补贴额应为1376.90亿元。而我国2010年中央政府提供的农业保险补贴额度仅有103.2亿元，相比之下，农业保险补贴规模还严重不足。

第六，对于“农业保险补贴补得效果如何”这个问题，本书认为，保费补贴在提高农业保险参与率方面作用有限，尽管我国农业保险补贴比率已经达到全球最高，但是农业保险的覆盖面并不理想，补贴效率并不令人满意。另外，在农业保险补贴实践中，投保人、保险公司和基层政府各种道德风险行为开始显现，导致政府财政资金存在耗费现象。

第七，对于“农业保险补贴如何补得更好”这个问题，本书在分析我国农业保险补贴现存问题的基础上，提出了相应的对策建议：加快立法，使农业保险补贴法制化；明确农业保险的主管部门，建立部门间合作机制；加强对农业保险的宣传，提高农民保险意识；减少农业保险补贴的政府层级；建立高效的财政补贴资金流转方式；因地制宜扩大农业保险补贴范围；试行农业保险经营管理费用补贴；加强对农业保险的税收优惠；加快建立财政支持的农业巨灾风险分散机制；采用多种方式防范道德风险和逆选择；通过非补贴措施提高农业保险覆盖率。

本书写作是集体创作的结晶，作者位次为冯文丽、苏晓鹏、张华鹏和郝洁。其中冯文丽负责撰写导言、第3章、第7章、第10章、第13章及全书统稿，苏晓鹏负责撰写第1章、第2章、第4章、第5章、第6章、第9章、第11章和第12章，负责整理参考文献、附录1和附录2；张华鹏负责撰写第8章；郝洁负责设计附录3的调查问卷。

在本书的写作过程中，我们参阅了很多专家学者的先期研究成果；农业保险专家庹国柱教授为本书的重要观点进行了论证；河北经贸大学2008级保险班石岩等同学利用暑假社会实践为本书作了相关问题调研；硕士研究生郝洁同学收集整理了部分资料；中国社会科学出版社的宫京蕾女士为本书出版提供了很大的帮助和宝贵建议。在此一并表示衷心的感谢！由于时间仓促，书中不足，敬请各位读者批评指正。

冯文丽

2011年9月2日

This book is the main content of the final results of the 2009 Ministry of Education Humanities and Social Science Research General Project Fund "Research on the Government Subsidy of Agricultural Insurance in China" (project number: 09YJA790059), and it is also one of the phased results of the 2011 Hebei Provincial Social Science Foundation project "Research on the Innovation of China's Agricultural Catastrophe Risk Management System" (project number: HB2011QR43), and was also funded by the Academic Publishing Fund of Hebei University of Economics and Business. The publication of this book aims to provide some information for the improvement of China's agricultural insurance subsidy system. Agricultural insurance is one of the three pillars of modern agricultural development, and is one of the "green box policies" that the WTO allows countries to support agriculture, which has strong welfare effects, credit support effects and policy effects on agriculture and national economic development. However, due to the insurability of agricultural risks, the complexity of agricultural insurance demand determination, the serious systemic risks and information asymmetry problems faced by agricultural insurance supply, and the characteristics of "double positive externalities" in agricultural insurance supply and demand, Chinese and foreign academics have basically reached a consensus: agricultural insurance is a policy insurance, which needs government subsidies to increase participation rate and achieve government policy goals. In the practice of agricultural insurance, the United States, Canada and other countries have implemented subsidy policies for agricultural insurance for many years. In 2007, China's central government began to carry out the pilot of premium subsidy for agricultural insurance, which opened the prelude to the rapid development of agricultural insurance. From 2007 to 2010, the agricultural insurance premium income was 5.184 billion yuan, 11.07 billion yuan, 13.39 billion yuan and 13.57 billion yuan, respectively, which was 6.13 times, 13.09 times, 15.83 times and 16.04 times that of 2006 when the subsidy policy was not implemented. Obviously, government subsidies are an important booster for the development of agricultural insurance in China. But at the same time, many problems have emerged in China's agricultural insurance subsidy pilot: subsidies lack legislative norms, lack of stability and continuity of policy support; The scale of subsidies has increased year after year, but it is still insufficient compared with the added value of agriculture and the importance of agriculture in China. The scope of agricultural insurance subsidies is narrow, and many important crops and breeding animals have not yet been included in the scope of subsidies; The subsidy method is relatively single, there is only one way of premium subsidy, and the subsidy methods such as operation and management cost subsidies, reinsurance subsidies and tax incentives have not yet been used; The proportion of premium subsidies is high, but the subsidy efficiency is not ideal; In the practice of agricultural insurance subsidies, various moral hazard behaviors of policyholders, insurers and grassroots governments began to appear, resulting in the consumption of subsidy funds. There are many government levels of premium subsidies, and the limited financial resources of grassroots governments have become an important bottleneck in the implementation of agricultural insurance subsidy policies, and so on. This book intends to solve these agricultural insurance subsidy problems as the starting point, and systematically study the theoretical and practical issues of agricultural insurance subsidies such as "why supplements", "what is the role of supplementation", "how to make up", "what to supplement", "how much to supplement", "how efficient to make up" and "how to make up better". The main views and research conclusions of this book are: First, for the question of "why subsidize agricultural insurance", this book analyzes from the perspectives of welfare economics, market failure theory, game theory, agricultural protection theory and risk insurability theory, and comes to the same conclusion: agricultural insurance is a policy insurance, pure commercial operation is unsustainable, and the government should subsidize agricultural insurance. Second, on the question of "what is the role of agricultural insurance subsidies", this book believes that government subsidies for agricultural insurance can produce the effects of stimulating the demand for agricultural insurance, stimulating the supply of agricultural insurance, strengthening farmers' awareness of insurance, promoting social welfare, and realizing agricultural protection. Third, on the question of "how to subsidize agricultural insurance", this book compares the agricultural insurance subsidy legislation of the United States, Japan, the Philippines and France, and concludes that the supply of agricultural insurance subsidy system should be based on the premise and basis of perfect agricultural insurance legislation, establish a long-term mechanism for agricultural insurance subsidies, and prevent the uncertainty and arbitrariness of agricultural insurance subsidies. In addition, this book also systematically analyzes six ways of agricultural insurance subsidies, namely capital support, premium subsidies, operating and management expense subsidies, reinsurance subsidies, tax incentives and agricultural catastrophe risk reserve funds, and puts forward which subsidy methods should be adopted first in China. Fourth, for the question of "what to supplement agricultural insurance subsidies", this book compares and studies the insurance subjects and insurance responsibilities of agricultural insurance subsidies in other countries, believes that the scope of agricultural insurance subsidies in China is relatively narrow, and suggests that the scope of varieties of financial subsidies for agricultural insurance should be appropriately expanded, and the provinces should be granted the authority to flexibly determine subsidized varieties according to local actual conditions, such as referring to Zhejiang's experience in the planting industry to adopt N (basic varieties) + X (other varieties, each province can choose its own) method, so as to plant a large area in various places. Cash crops and facility vegetables that are important for promoting the development of modern agriculture, livestock and poultry that are of great significance to stabilizing the people's vegetable basket project and increasing farmers' income, etc. are included in the scope of subsidies. Fifth, for the question of "how much agricultural insurance subsidies are subsidized", this book believes that China's agricultural insurance subsidy standards or subsidy ratios (the proportion of government subsidies to premiums) have reached an average of 80% or even higher, which has reached the highest level in the world, and there is no room for further improvement. However, due to the narrow scope of agricultural insurance subsidies in China and the low level of protection (only the cost of insurance), although the subsidy ratio is high, the total subsidy scale is not large. According to the empirical ratio of total agricultural insurance subsidies in the United States to 3.4% of agricultural GDP, China's agricultural insurance subsidies in 2010 should be 137.690 billion yuan. In 2010, the amount of agricultural insurance subsidies provided by the central government in China was only 10.32 billion yuan, which is still seriously insufficient in comparison. Sixth, for the question of "how effective is the agricultural insurance subsidy supplement", this book believes that the role of premium subsidies in increasing the participation rate of agricultural insurance is limited, although China's agricultural insurance subsidy ratio has reached the highest in the world, but the coverage of agricultural insurance is not ideal, and the subsidy efficiency is not satisfactory. In addition, in the practice of agricultural insurance subsidies, various moral hazard behaviors of policyholders, insurance companies and grassroots governments have begun to appear, resulting in the consumption of government financial funds. Seventh, on the question of "how to make up for agricultural insurance subsidies better", this book puts forward corresponding countermeasures and suggestions on the basis of analyzing the existing problems of agricultural insurance subsidies in China: accelerate legislation and legalize agricultural insurance subsidies; Clarify the competent authorities for agricultural insurance and establish inter-departmental cooperation mechanisms; Strengthen the publicity of agricultural insurance and raise farmers' awareness of insurance; reducing the government hierarchy of agricultural insurance subsidies; Establish an efficient way of circulating financial subsidy funds; Expand the scope of agricultural insurance subsidies according to local conditions; Trial implementation of subsidies for agricultural insurance operation and management costs; strengthening tax incentives for agricultural insurance; Accelerate the establishment of financially supported agricultural catastrophe risk diversification mechanisms; Adopt a variety of ways to prevent moral hazard and adverse selection; Increase agricultural insurance coverage through non-subsidized measures. The writing of this book is the result of collective creation, and the authors are Feng Wenli, Su Xiaopeng, Zhang Huapeng and Hao Jie. Among them, Feng Wenli is responsible for writing the introduction, chapter 3, chapter 7, chapter 10, chapter 13 and the overall manuscript, and Su Xiaopeng is responsible for writing chapter 1, chapter 2, chapter 4, chapter 5, chapter 6, chapter 9, chapter 11 and chapter 12, responsible for sorting out references, appendix 1 and appendix 2; Zhang Huapeng is responsible for writing Chapter 8; Hao Jie was responsible for designing the Appendix 3 questionnaire. In the process of writing this book, we have consulted the previous research results of many experts and scholars; Professor Yu Guozhu, an expert in agricultural insurance, demonstrated the important points of this book; Shi Yan, the 2008 insurance class of Hebei University of Economics and Business, and other students used the social practice of summer vacation to investigate relevant issues for this book; Master student Hao Jie collected and sorted out some information; Ms. Gong Jinglei from China Social Sciences Press provided great help and valuable suggestions for the publication of this book. Thank you all sincerely! Due to the lack of time, the book is insufficient, so please criticize and correct it. Feng Wenli, September 2, 2011（AI翻译）