当代西方科学哲学的发展可谓乱象环生。从逻辑经验主义开始，到历史主义的科学哲学、科学实在论与反实在论，再到各种知识辩护的观点，直至目前方兴未艾的科学知识社会学，其所运行的脉络是错综复杂的。但是，在其发展过程中也不乏规律可循。众所周知，20世纪以来的西方科学哲学，包括罗素、维特根斯坦等人的分析哲学，一开始就是从反形而上学的思辨起家的。“拒斥形而上学”也许是20世纪大多数哲学家的共同呼声！究竟从何处着手反对形而上学？并且如何使这种反对形而上学的理论令人心悦诚服？这些问题取决于当代哲学认识论研究在技术上的突破。逻辑经验主义与分析哲学以哲学逻辑为突破口，通过逻辑分析来宣布形而上学命题之无意义，他们把形而上学命题当作无法得到经验证实的假设，而一切有意义的命题均须得到经验的证实与逻辑的证明。这样，就把那些第一哲学的命题全都排斥在自己的视野之外了。这种在分析手段与研究方法上的突破，逐步导致了当代西方科学哲学的非哲学化趋势。

之所以突破了研究的方法，是因为到20世纪初哲学自身的分化已经到了终场，自然科学早已从哲学中一步一步地分离出来，最后从哲学中分离出来的则是心理学。所以，20世纪初，除了逻辑学外再无其他学科保留在哲学之中。因此，20世纪的科学哲学就是逻辑学。同时，随着自然科学的发展，科学观深入人心，在人们心目中，只有那些得到科学观察证实的知识才是可靠的知识，而那些无法得到科学观察证实的知识则只能悬置起来暂不争论。于是，就出现了还原论哲学，即把所有的哲学思想都还原为一个个语言命题，只有还原为语言命题才能与客观事实相对应。这样，命题的意义即是由相对应的事实或逻辑来决定。因为，在内容上，逻辑是对客观事实所存在的规律的概括；而在形式上，逻辑则是由普遍化的公理所组成的。逻辑命题（分析命题）与经验命题（综合命题）成为两类重要的哲学命题，除此外再无其他命题是有意义的。

这种分析命题与综合命题之绝对区分也绝不是没有问题的。奎因指出了分析命题与综合命题的区分以及经验论的还原论观点是“经验论的两个教条”，他认为分析命题与综合命题的区分抑或还原论都是不可能的，所有的命题归根结底都是来自于经验。然而，分析哲学和逻辑经验主义的这种基本观点并不因奎因的批评所驳倒，正如同拉卡托斯所说的那样，科学家都是厚脸皮的，他不会因为自己的观点受到批判而轻易地放弃自己的见解，而是通过改变哲学论题，通过修正辅助性假说使理论沿着自己的逻辑继续发展，对逻辑推理的前提进行辩护，对经验命题的信息内容加以扩充。

但是，所有科学哲学或科学认识论理论都存在着两个根本的问题：其一是认识论的前提即推理中的信念的辩护，其二是理论能否得到观察事实的证实。因为一切逻辑推论都需要有一个预设的前提，通过这个前提的存在，我们才有可能进行推理。这个预设的前提我们叫做信念，这个信念是否得到确证，是这个推理之是否能够有效的标准，如果这个信念是已经得到确证的真信念，那么这个推理结果就是真的。其三，理论所阐述的概念其所指需要得到观察事实的证实，如果一个观察事实能够与命题相吻合，那么这个命题就是真的。如果上述这两个问题得不到解决，那么一切经验论都将会失去其根基，就会导致彻底的破产。然而，对作为前提的信念的证明却谈何容易啊！或者必须求助于逻辑的推断，或者必须求助于事实的观察，逻辑的推断容易出现循环论证，而观察事实也不一定是一个客观的过程，观察渗透着理论，负载着理论，受个人背景信念之影响。因此，对这两个问题如何进行辩护，决定着当代西方科学哲学研究的基本走向。

首先，对逻辑的前提的辩护会出现无限后退的循环论证。如果我们将信念的辩护诉诸别的已经确证了的信念，那么别的确证了的信念就得诉诸以往的已经确证了的信念，这样就会出现无穷后退的循环论证。如果一个信念要诉诸观察，那么由于观察渗透着理论，难免会带有一定的主观性，这是不符合我们经验论的要求的。

其次，哲学命题的意义依赖于哲学本身的方法来论证，这种论证方法是否有效？大多数当代的科学哲学家都认为，我们用哲学的方法来论证哲学的命题，一定会给怀疑论留下反驳的空间。一个命题的真之是否有效，必须依赖于科学的方法来证明，因为到目前为止，只有科学才给人类带来巨大的成功，只有科学才是受人所尊重的。科学之所以受人尊重，是因为科学理论的本质不是假设，它在认知上是可以按照现代认知心理学的实验来证明的。这就为自然主义的存在腾出了空间。

但是，科学也不是十全十美的。当我们用科学方法验证了人的认识是怎么形成时，我们却发现认识者受其先前的信念、文化背景知识等所影响，乃至他人思想与评价也对个人的认识起影响作用。科学社会学揭示了科学与社会之间的互动关系，科学知识社会学则揭示了科学认识与认识者的文化、历史、社会因素之间的关系。这就是说，科学认识过程具有社会学所研究的空间。研究科学认识的社会学因素，诸如个人认识与集体认识之间的关系、个人文化背景与个人认识之间的关系、社会意识形态与个人认识的关系等等。这些社会学因素的研究可以对科学认识的形成作出科学的说明。因此，认识论的研究在走向自然主义化的同时，也出现了社会学化的趋势。

然而，不管我们如何研究、如何积极地去解决人类认识过程中所产生的问题，我们都会遭到不确定性的骚扰，确定性与不确定性之间的矛盾是一对不断产生又不断解决且永远也不能彻底解决的矛盾。理论的普遍性与特殊的反例之间的对立始终是存在的。当我们无法辩证地解决这对矛盾时，我们就会在逻辑上以个别反例否定普遍性的结论。逻辑主义者没有意识到个别反例是经常存在的，科学的目的就是为了对个别事实获得普遍性的概括，这些概括符合概率论的大数定律，但却无法排除个别反例。即使我们概括了百分之九十九点九，我们也还不能排除那个百分之零点一。但这无妨科学权威性地位的确立，无伤科学是成功的美誉。假如我们站在逻辑主义的立场来看，当人们沉溺于逻辑时，人们会对我们的认识能力感到失望，会因为我们不能确立绝对的确定性而感到悲观。所以，当科学实在论与反实在论争论无休无止时，一些虚无主义者便抛出了哲学的悲观论调，他们高喊反形而上学的口号，举着后现代科学哲学的旗子，招回相对主义的亡灵，敲响了科学哲学达达主义的丧钟！

本书正是在这样的基础上概括当代西方科学哲学的非哲学化走向的。导论部分是一个总体说明，它所要表明的是本书的总体思路，把当代西方科学哲学的发展趋向概括为三个方面，即科学哲学的虚无主义化、认识论研究的自然化以及社会学化。接下来的论述便是按照这三个方面而展开，第一部分即第一章至第三章，论述的是科学实在论与反实在论的争论过程中产生了虚无主义科学哲学；第二部分，即第四章至第六章，论述了当代西方科学哲学在知识辩护方面的诸种观点以及在此基础上出现的自然主义化的趋向；第三部分，即第七章至第九章，论述了知识论研究中的社会学化趋势，以及这三大趋势的发展对我们的启示。在论述这三个趋势时，其中不乏对当代西方科学哲学观点的评论。从这个研究来看，涉及的时间从20世纪六七十年代开始直至21世纪，前后横贯四十年，所涉及的资料浩如烟海。好在本人自1991年开始在夏基松先生指导下，即涉及对当代西方科学哲学尤其是对科学实在论与反实在论争论的研究，之后的教学与研究过程一直也未中断。本书部分章节也早在《哲学研究》、《学术月刊》、《自然辩证法研究》、《国外社会科学》等刊物上发表过。至于某些理论观点的历史叙述，作者也延续了以前的著作。这些年来，除了自己平时积累的资料外，最有助于我的研究的是北京大学的“人文小屋”，她提供给我十分珍贵的研究资料，特别是近几年有关西方科学哲学方面的英文著作，这对我完成该项目不能不说是一大帮助！既节约了去各大图书馆查询资料的时间，也节约了复制那些资料的费用。在此，我对北京大学人文小屋表示由衷的感谢！

不尽如人意的是，我对当代西方科学哲学的资料还未及全面仔细认真地阅读，所及内容不一定包容性很强。这一方面是由于本人能力所限，另一方面也因时间不允许。当代西方科学哲学的各种流派和思想观点还有待依靠同仁们共同去深入研究与把握，在此我只不过提供给大家一个理解的参照点而已，热切希望同仁们对此多提意见！

作者于浙江师范大学

The development of contemporary Western philosophy of science can be described as chaotic. Starting from logical empiricism, to historicist philosophy of science, scientific realism and anti-realism, to various ideas of knowledge defense, to the current emerging sociology of scientific knowledge, the context of its operation is intricate. However, there are also rules to follow in its development. As we all know, Western philosophy of science since the 20th century, including the analytic philosophy of Russell, Wittgenstein and others, began with anti-metaphysical speculation. "Rejection of metaphysics" is perhaps the common cry of most philosophers of the 20th century! Where exactly does the opposition to metaphysics begin? And how to make this anti-metaphysical theory pleasing and convincing? These questions depend on technological breakthroughs in contemporary philosophical epistemological research. Logical empiricism and analytic philosophy use philosophical logic as a breakthrough to declare the meaninglessness of metaphysical propositions through logical analysis, they regard metaphysical propositions as hypotheses that cannot be confirmed empirically, and all meaningful propositions must be confirmed empirically and proved by logic. In this way, all the propositions of the first philosophy are excluded from their vision. This breakthrough in analytical means and research methods has gradually led to the trend of de-philosophizing contemporary Western philosophy of science. The reason for breaking through the method of research is because by the beginning of the 20th century, the differentiation of philosophy itself had reached its end, and natural science had long been separated from philosophy step by step, and finally psychology was separated from philosophy. Thus, at the beginning of the 20th century, no discipline other than logic remained in philosophy. Thus, the philosophy of science in the 20th century was logic. At the same time, with the development of natural science, the concept of science is deeply rooted in the hearts of the people, in people's minds, only those knowledge confirmed by scientific observation are reliable knowledge, and those knowledge that cannot be confirmed by scientific observation can only be suspended and put aside for the time being. As a result, reductionist philosophy emerged, that is, all philosophical ideas are reduced to linguistic propositions, and only by reducing them to linguistic propositions can they correspond to objective facts. In this way, the meaning of a proposition is determined by the corresponding fact or logic. Because, in content, logic is a generalization of the laws that exist in objective facts; Formally, logic is made up of generalized axioms. Logical propositions (analytic propositions) and empirical propositions (synthetic propositions) become two important philosophical propositions, and no other proposition is meaningful. This absolute distinction between analytic propositions and synthetic propositions is by no means unproblematic. Quinn pointed out that the distinction between analytic propositions and synthetic propositions and the reductionist view of empiricism are " two dogmas of empiricism " , arguing that the distinction between analytical propositions and synthetic propositions or reductionism is impossible , and that all propositions ultimately come from experience. However, this basic view of analytic philosophy and logical empiricism is not refuted by Quinn's criticism, as Lakatos said, the scientist is cheeky, he does not easily abandon his opinion because his point of view is criticized, but by changing the philosophical topic, by modifying the auxiliary hypothesis to make the theory continue to develop along his own logic, defending the premises of logical reasoning, and expanding the information content of empirical propositions. However, all philosophies of science or theories of scientific epistemology have two fundamental problems: one is the epistemological premise, that is, the defense of beliefs in reasoning, and the other is whether the theory can be confirmed by observed facts. Because all logical inferences need to have a predetermined premise, through the existence of this premise, we can make reasoning. This premise is called belief, whether this belief is confirmed is the criterion for whether this reasoning can be valid, and if this belief is a true belief that has been confirmed, then the result of this reasoning is true. Third, the concept elaborated by the theory needs to be confirmed by the observed fact, and if an observation fact can agree with the proposition, then the proposition is true. If these two problems are not solved, then all empiricism will lose its roots and will lead to complete bankruptcy. However, the proof of belief as a prerequisite is not easy! Either you must resort to logical inference, or you must resort to the observation of facts, logical inference is prone to circular argumentation, and observing facts is not necessarily an objective process, observation permeates the theory, carries the theory, and is affected by personal background beliefs. Therefore, how to defend these two questions determines the basic direction of contemporary Western philosophical research on science. First, the defense of the premise of logic is accompanied by an infinitely backward circular argument. If we appeal to other proven beliefs in the defense of beliefs, then other confirmed beliefs have to appeal to previous confirmed beliefs, and then there will be an infinite backward circular argument. If a belief appeals to observation, then because observation permeates the theory, it will inevitably carry a certain subjectivity, which is not in line with the requirements of our empiricism. Second, the meaning of philosophical propositions depends on the method of argumentation in philosophy itself, is this method of argument effective? Most contemporary philosophers of science believe that our philosophical approach to arguing philosophical propositions will inevitably leave room for skepticism to refute it. Whether the truth of a proposition is valid or not must depend on scientific methods to prove it, because so far only science has brought great success to mankind, and only science has been respected. Science is respected because the essence of a scientific theory is not a hypothesis, it can be cognitively proved according to the experiments of modern cognitive psychology. This makes room for the existence of naturalism. However, science is not perfect either. When we use scientific methods to verify how people's understanding is formed, we find that the knower is influenced by his previous beliefs, cultural background knowledge, etc., and even the thoughts and evaluations of others also affect personal understanding. The sociology of science reveals the interaction between science and society, while the sociology of scientific knowledge reveals the relationship between scientific understanding and the cultural, historical and social factors of the knower. That is to say, the process of scientific knowledge has room for sociological study. Study the sociological factors of scientific understanding, such as the relationship between individual cognition and collective cognition, the relationship between individual cultural background and personal cognition, the relationship between social ideology and individual cognition, and so on. The study of these sociological factors can provide a scientific explanation for the formation of scientific understanding. Therefore, while the study of epistemology is moving towards naturalism, there is also a trend towards sociologization. However, no matter how we study and actively solve the problems that arise in the process of human understanding, we will be harassed by uncertainty, and the contradiction between certainty and uncertainty is a pair of contradictions that are constantly generated and constantly solved and can never be completely resolved. The opposition between the universality of theories and particular counterexamples has always existed. When we cannot resolve this pair dialectically, we logically negate the conclusion of universality with individual counterexamples. Logicians do not realize that individual counterexamples are constant, and that the purpose of science is to obtain generalizations about individual facts that conform to the law of large numbers in probability theory, but cannot exclude individual counterexamples. Even if we summarize 99.9 percent, we cannot rule out that 0.1 percent. But this does not hinder the establishment of scientific authority, and science is a reputation for success. If we look at it from a logical standpoint, when people indulge in logic, people will be disappointed in our cognitive ability and pessimistic because we cannot establish absolute certainty. Therefore, when the debate between scientific realism and anti-realism is endless, some nihilists throw out philosophical pessimistic arguments, they shout anti-metaphysical slogans, hold the flag of postmodern philosophy of science, call back the dead of relativism, and sound the death knell of Dadaism in philosophy of science! It is on this basis that this book summarizes the non-philosophizing trend of contemporary Western philosophy of science. The introductory part is a general explanation, which is to show the general idea of the book, summarizing the development trend of contemporary Western philosophy of science into three aspects, namely, the nihilism of philosophy of science, the naturalization of epistemological research, and the sociology. The following discussion is based on these three aspects, the first part, chapters 1 to 3, which deal with the nihilistic philosophy of science produced in the debate between scientific realism and anti-realism; The second part, chapters IV to VI, deals with the various views of contemporary Western philosophy of science in the defense of knowledge and the tendency towards naturalism on this basis; The third part, Chapters 7 to 9, discusses the sociological trends in epistemological research and what the development of these three trends has implications for us. In discussing these three trends, many of them comment on contemporary Western philosophical views of science. From the perspective of this research, the time involved covers the period from the sixties and seventies of the 20th century to the 21st century, spanning 40 years, and the information involved is vast. Fortunately, under the guidance of Mr. Sharkisson since 1991, I have been involved in the research of contemporary Western philosophy of science, especially the debate between scientific realism and anti-realism, and the teaching and research process has not been interrupted since then. Some chapters of this book have also been published in journals such as Philosophical Research, Academic Monthly, Studies in Dialectics of Nature, and Foreign Social Sciences. As for the historical narrative of certain theoretical views, the author also continues the previous works. Over the years, in addition to the information I usually accumulate, the most helpful research is the "Humanities Hut" of Peking University, she has provided me with very valuable research materials, especially in recent years on Western philosophy of science in English, which can not but be a great help to me to complete this project! It not only saves the time of going to major libraries to search for materials, but also saves the cost of copying those materials. Here, I would like to express my heartfelt thanks to Peking University Humanities Cottage! What is unsatisfactory is that I have not read the material on contemporary Western philosophy of science in a comprehensive and careful manner, and the content is not necessarily very inclusive. On the one hand, this is due to my own limitations, and on the other hand, because time does not allow. The various schools and ideas of contemporary Western philosophy of science still need to be studied and grasped by colleagues, and here I just provide you with a reference point for understanding, and I sincerely hope that colleagues will give more opinions on this! The author is from Zhejiang Normal University（AI翻译）