本书从现代科技革命背景下股权结构和股东类型的新变化、经济全球化浪潮、制度依赖与变迁、政治民主理念、和谐社会思潮等多个研究视角全方位立体透视了公司治理法律制度。重点研究了以下内容并得出了以下主要观点。

第一，从古典企业到现代企业制度演进的历史角度，全面考察了现代公司制度兴起的历史必然性，并从现代企业制度所具有的不同于古典企业的独特之处，论证了公司治理产生的根源。认为现代公司股权结构的多元化和分散化是公司治理产生的经济根源，现代公司机关的分权性是公司治理产生的政治根源，现代公司经营的代理性是公司治理产生的道德根源，现代公司责任的多元化是公司治理产生的思想根源。

第二，对公司治理的理论分析框架进行了全面地历史地动态考察和梳理，论证了公司治理的理论起源及其理论分析起点。主要从公司治理产生原因的经济学理论解释中，重点分析了三种最具代表性的公司治理理论分析模型：威廉姆森的有限理性假定与机会主义假设模型、伯利—米恩斯的两权分离—委托代理问题模型和钱德勒的职业经理人内部控制模型。通过对这些模型的分析考察提出了公司治理的本质是在放松管制背景下国家对公司自治的必要干预和适度管制的观点。

第三，对公司治理本位的争论进行了历史唯物主义的辩证分析。对比考察了两种对立的公司治理本位理论：股东本位观和利益相关者本位观。一方面，分析了股东至上主义形成的历史逻辑起点，重点考察了股东至上主义的几种最具代表性的理论解释：主观风险偏好差异说：一个主观的辩解；团队可监督性差别说：一个纯技术的解释。资产专用性—不完全合约理论解释：一种客观的解说和讨价能力差别说：一种实证的分析。另外，也分析了利益相关者主义产生的时代背景，在众多的利益相关者本位理论如经济民主理论、公司社会责任理论以及人力资本专用性理论等中只对其中最具解释力的人力资本理论进行了重点评论。并通过对这两种公司治理本位理论所对应的两大公司治理模式即单边治理模式和共同治理模式的法律上的回应及其各自所面临的现实挑战和难题，认为单纯的股东本位不足以有效解决公司治理的全部问题，而单纯的利益相关者本位则不具有现实可行性，只有以股东本位为核心同时适当兼顾最具相关性的利益相关者的利益才是公司法和公司治理改革应有的理念和方向。

第四，通过不同法系公司治理模式的比较研究和实证研究，论证了不同的股权结构和股东类型决定着不同的公司治理模式特征和公司治理的各自难题。在股权高度分散的情况下，资本市场可以在公司治理中发挥重大作用，公司治理的重点是所有与控制的分离所导致的内部人控制和做假账，如美国和英国；在股权高度集中的情况下，公司治理的重点则是控制股东利用公司侵害中小股东、银行等债权人、雇员的权益，如德国和日本，所以在这些国家，银行和员工广泛参与公司治理。正因为如此，我们提出了资本结构和融资结构是形成不同治理模式的经济基础，股权分布结构和股东类型结构构成公司治理的制度基础的观点。明确了两种典型股权结构和股东类型下的公司治理的不同重点和难题：管理层对股东的代理问题和大股东对中小股东的代理问题。

第五，股权分置作为历史遗留下来的我国资本市场一项重大基础制度缺失，长期以来扭曲证券市场定价机制，使公司治理缺乏共同的利益机制。股权分置改革作为我国资本市场的一项重大的基础性制度变革，其本质在于消除影响资本市场功能的制度性障碍，推动资本市场运行机制的转换。从这个意义上讲，股权分置改革是我国证券市场建立以来的“第二次革命”。对价是股权分置改革的核心问题，监管层、大股东、公众投资者、经济界金融界专家学者、法律界人士等在对价问题上存在严重分歧，并直接导致股市产生重大波动。正确认识对价的法律性质，准确把握支付对价的法律依据，关系到股权分置改革的合法性问题，同时也关系到国有资产是否流失的大是大非问题，也事关广大流通股股东的权益是否受到侵害，关系到投资者对资本市场的预期和对未来投资的信心，从根本上说，关系到证券市场的稳定和社会的稳定，关系到社会主义和谐社会的建设。要准确把握对价的应有之义，就要从改革的大背景下思考，从股权分置改革的意义上去理解，同时看到在改革中，政府、非流通股股东、流通股股东等市场参与各方在社会经济制度变革、资本市场制度改革中各自应承担的历史使命、责任与义务的高度去理解。我们认为，对价的本质就是改革的成本，谁支付对价就是谁支付改革的成本，这是对对价的定性分析；至于非流通股股东支付了多少对价，流通股股东得到了多少利益，其本质是非流通股股东承担了多少改革的成本，即是改革的成本在非流通股股东和流通股股东之间具体的分担情况，这是对对价的定量分析。股权分置改革的完成一方面扫除了上市公司股权结构分散化与多元化的制度障碍，另一方面提供了机构、法人股东积极参与上市公司治理的制度基础。同时，股权分置改革的完成还为公司控制权市场的公司治理功能的发挥提供了基础平台，引起了我国公司控制权市场的新变化。

第六，提出了公司治理诉讼机制的观点，即通过强化法律责任，落实责任追究来加强公司治理。特别是提出要强化大股东的责任，并通过股东和债权人诉讼来进行责任追究。这在我国尤其具有重大的理论意义和现实意义。在董事责任追究方面，重点考察了日本的立法变迁。认为公司立法要服务于经济发展，董事责任立法的缓和抑或严格要与宏观经济发展状况相契合。日本对董事责任追究的缓和抑或严格的调节是通过直接调控股东代表诉讼制度的激励或约束的要件的适时修改来间接完成的。伴随着日本经济由战后重建到高速起飞后泡沫经济破灭再到长期低迷，董事责任则经历了由放任到严格再到适度缓和的过程。对应地，则通过对股东代表诉讼由严格限制到大力鼓励再到适度限制的立法发展来调控。但日本经济在腾飞时期忽视了董事责任的控制，积弊之深导致公司治理严重失灵，直到经济泡沫破灭后，才严格董事责任追究，秋后算账反而又阻碍了经济的回暖，面对各方强烈批评又不得不放松和缓和责任追究。这一教训值得我们深思。我国当前是否正在重复日本的故事，我们应当保持警惕。对于股东代表诉讼的制度设计而言，一方面要对代表诉讼的提起进行恰如其分地激励以充分发挥其积极作用；另一方面又要时刻防止代表诉讼的滥用以将其消极作用压制在最小的空间内。这便成了各国公司立法十分棘手而又无法回避的一个难点。

通过对现行董事虚假陈述责任制度的考察，认为纵观天下法律一般只倾向于实现连带责任的救济功能，而不在意或者有意无意中淡化连带责任的惩罚功能和威慑功能。认为后一个问题是侵权者内部的事，法律没有必要进行过多的干预。我国现行董事证券虚假陈述侵权连带责任制度的安排一般都止于责任的认定，忽视或者说漠视责任的具体分配，特别是责任的最后承担者。谁是最后的掏腰包者，恰恰是侵权责任的功能实现及价值取向的集中反映。如果在公司承担最后责任的情况下，连带责任就演变成了单纯的公司责任，也就成了应当承担责任的公司幕后决策人逃避责任上演金蝉脱壳的工具，导致公司治理机能的完全丧失。在公司内部，连带责任只在同质性主体之间适用其作用才能发挥得淋漓尽致，所以只应在董事之间、股东之间适用连带责任并要明确其各自的份额，而在董事、股东、公司之间不能适用连带责任，只能适用补充责任并明确其顺位。

第七，面对构建和谐中国和和谐世界的和谐社会理念的要求，将公司治理的变革置于对和谐社会构建的回应以构建和谐公司。结合本土资源，充分发挥党组织、行业协会、工会、职工及职代会参与和谐公司治理构建，并基于分配公平理念，将公司治理作为一种分配机制，充分发挥其构建和谐社会的独特作用和有效路径，这是本研究成果的最大特色之一，从而填补了公司治理在这方面研究的空白。和谐社会是人际关系平和的社会形态，人际关系平和的关键是各利益相关群体能够获得表达的渠道，能够施展他们的影响，社会具有保障他们表达和施展影响并最终能予以平衡的机制。从国家意义上讲，多元的利益诉求可以通过建立人民代表大会、社会政党等共同参与的模式达成。但是，作为微观层面的企业，在传统的公司治理的内部结构设计中，资方“所有权”的派生形式是公司治理的主要模式，诸如职工利益、公共利益等多元利益诉求和影响机制却难以建立。以此为立意着重讨论了在和谐社会之下非公有制企业党组织、工会、行业协会、职工等组织和利益主体在公司治理中的作用和影响以及基于分配公平的高管和职工薪酬制度的完善。

This book provides an all-round and three-dimensional perspective on the legal system of corporate governance from multiple research perspectives, such as new changes in equity structure and shareholder types, the wave of economic globalization, institutional dependence and change, the concept of political democracy, and the trend of harmonious social thought under the background of modern scientific and technological revolution. The following key points were studied and the following main points were drawn. First, from the historical perspective of the evolution of classical enterprises to modern enterprise systems, this paper comprehensively examines the historical inevitability of the rise of modern company systems, and demonstrates the root causes of corporate governance from the unique features of modern enterprise systems that are different from classical enterprises. It is believed that the diversification and decentralization of the equity structure of modern companies is the economic root of corporate governance, the decentralization of modern corporate organs is the political root of corporate governance, the agency nature of modern corporate operation is the moral root of corporate governance, and the pluralism of modern corporate responsibility is the ideological root of corporate governance. Second, the theoretical analysis framework of corporate governance is comprehensively and historically dynamically investigated and sorted out, and the theoretical origin of corporate governance and its theoretical analysis starting point are demonstrated. Mainly from the economic theory explanation of the causes of corporate governance, the three most representative analysis models of corporate governance theory are analyzed: Williamson's bounded rational assumption and opportunistic hypothesis model, Burleigh-Mynnes' separation of powers-principal-agent problem model, and Chandler's internal control model of professional managers. Through the analysis and examination of these models, the view that the essence of corporate governance is the necessary intervention and appropriate regulation of corporate autonomy by the state in the context of deregulation. Third, a dialectical analysis of historical materialism is made of the debate on corporate governance. Two opposing theories of corporate governance are contrasted: the shareholder-based view and the stakeholder-based view. On the one hand, it analyzes the historical logical starting point of the formation of shareholder supremacy, and focuses on several of the most representative theoretical explanations of shareholder supremacy: subjective risk appetite difference theory: a subjective justification; Team Supervisability Difference Theory: A purely technical explanation. Asset Exclusivity-Incomplete Contract Theory Explanation: An Objective Explanation and Bargaining Power Difference Theory: An Empirical Analysis. In addition, the background of the emergence of stakeholderism is analyzed, and among the many stakeholder-based theories, such as economic democracy theory, corporate social responsibility theory, and human capital exclusivity theory, only the most explanatory human capital theory is reviewed. Through the legal response to the two major corporate governance models corresponding to these two corporate governance theories, namely unilateral governance model and common governance model, and the practical challenges and problems faced by each of them, it is believed that the simple shareholder standard is not enough to effectively solve all the problems of corporate governance, while the simple stakeholder standard is not realistically feasible, and only taking the shareholder standard as the core while properly taking into account the interests of the most relevant stakeholders is the concept and direction that the company law and corporate governance reform should have. Fourth, through the comparative and empirical research of corporate governance models of different legal systems, it is demonstrated that different equity structures and shareholder types determine the characteristics of different corporate governance models and the respective problems of corporate governance. In the case of highly decentralized ownership, capital markets can play a significant role in corporate governance, which focuses on insider control and false accounting resulting from all separation from control, such as the United States and the United Kingdom; In the case of high concentration of equity, the focus of corporate governance is to control shareholders from using the company to infringe on the rights and interests of small and medium-sized shareholders, creditors and employees such as banks, such as Germany and Japan, so in these countries, banks and employees widely participate in corporate governance. Because of this, we put forward the view that capital structure and financing structure are the economic basis for forming different governance models, and the equity distribution structure and shareholder type structure constitute the institutional basis of corporate governance. The different focuses and problems of corporate governance under two typical equity structures and shareholder types are clarified: the proxy of management to shareholders and the agency of large shareholders to small and medium-sized shareholders. Fifth, as a major basic system of China's capital market left over from history, equity division has long distorted the pricing mechanism of the securities market, making corporate governance lack a common interest mechanism. As a major basic institutional reform of China's capital market, the essence of equity division reform is to eliminate institutional obstacles affecting the function of the capital market and promote the transformation of the capital market operation mechanism. In this sense, the reform of equity division is the "second revolution" since the establishment of China's securities market. Consideration is the core issue of equity division reform, and there are serious differences between regulators, major shareholders, public investors, experts and scholars in the economic circles, financial circles, and legal circles on the consideration issue, which directly leads to major fluctuations in the stock market. Correctly understanding the legal nature of the consideration and accurately grasping the legal basis for paying the consideration have a bearing on the legality of the reform of equity division, and at the same time on the major issue of right and wrong whether state-owned assets are lost, whether the rights and interests of the vast number of shareholders with outstanding shares are infringed, on investors' expectations of the capital market and confidence in future investment, fundamentally speaking, on the stability of the securities market and social stability, and on the construction of a harmonious socialist society. To accurately grasp the proper meaning of consideration, it is necessary to think from the general context of the reform, understand it in the sense of the reform of equity division, and at the same time see that in the reform, the government, non-tradable shareholders, tradable shareholders and other market participants should bear their respective historical missions, responsibilities and obligations in the reform of the social and economic system and the reform of the capital market system. We believe that the essence of consideration is the cost of reform, and whoever pays the consideration is who pays the cost of reform, which is a qualitative analysis of consideration; As for how much consideration was paid by non-tradable shareholders and how much benefit was obtained by tradable shareholders, the essence is how much the non-tradable shareholders bear the cost of reform, that is, the specific sharing of the cost of reform between non-tradable shareholders and tradable shareholders, which is a quantitative analysis of consideration. On the one hand, the completion of the reform of equity division has removed the institutional obstacles to the decentralization and diversification of the equity structure of listed companies, and on the other hand, it has provided an institutional basis for institutional and corporate shareholders to actively participate in the governance of listed companies. At the same time, the completion of the reform of equity division also provides a basic platform for the exertion of the corporate governance function of the corporate control market, which has caused new changes in China's corporate control market. Sixth, it puts forward the view of corporate governance litigation mechanism, that is, strengthening corporate governance by strengthening legal responsibility and implementing accountability. In particular, it is proposed to strengthen the responsibility of major shareholders and pursue responsibility through shareholder and creditor litigation. This is of great theoretical and practical significance in our country. In terms of directors' accountability, the focus is on legislative changes in Japan. It is believed that corporate legislation should serve economic development, and the easing or strict easing of directors' responsibility legislation should be consistent with macroeconomic development. In Japan, the easing or strict regulation of directors' liability is done indirectly by modifying the incentive or binding elements that directly regulate the shareholder representative litigation system. As the Japanese economy went from post-war reconstruction to the bursting of the bubble economy after the high-speed take-off to the long-term downturn, the responsibility of directors has undergone a process from laissez-faire to strict to moderate. Correspondingly, it is regulated through the development of legislation that restricts shareholder representative litigation from strict restrictions to strong encouragement to moderate restrictions. However, the Japanese economy neglected the control of directors' responsibilities during the boom period, and the accumulated shortcomings led to serious failures in corporate governance, and it was not until the economic bubble burst that directors were strictly held accountable. This lesson is worth pondering. We should be vigilant about whether our country is repeating Japan's story at the moment. For the system design of shareholder representative litigation, on the one hand, it is necessary to appropriately stimulate the filing of representative litigation to give full play to its positive role; On the other hand, it is necessary to prevent the abuse of representative litigation at all times in order to suppress its negative effects in the smallest space. This has become a very difficult and unavoidable difficulty in the corporate legislation of various countries. Through the examination of the current liability system for directors' misrepresentation, it is believed that the law generally only tends to realize the remedy function of joint and several liability, and does not care about or intentionally or unintentionally dilute the punitive function and deterrent function of joint and several liability. It is believed that the latter issue is an internal matter for the infringer, and there is no need for the law to intervene too much. The arrangements for the current joint and several liability system for securities misrepresentation by directors in China generally stop at the determination of liability, ignoring or ignoring the specific allocation of liability, especially the final bearer of liability. Who is the last payer is precisely the concentrated reflection of the functional realization and value orientation of tort liability. If the company bears the final responsibility, joint and several liability will evolve into simple corporate responsibility, which will also become a tool for the behind-the-scenes decision-makers of the company who should be responsible to evade responsibility and stage the golden cicada shell, resulting in the complete loss of corporate governance function. In the company, joint and several liability can only be fully played by applying its role between homogeneous subjects, so joint and several liability should only be applied between directors and shareholders and their respective shares should be clarified, while joint and several liability cannot be applied between directors, shareholders and the company, only supplementary liability can be applied and their ranking should be clarified. Seventh, in the face of the requirements of the concept of building a harmonious society in a harmonious China and a harmonious world, the reform of corporate governance is placed in response to the construction of a harmonious society to build a harmonious company. Combined with local resources, giving full play to the participation of party organizations, industry associations, trade unions, employees and employee congresses in the construction of harmonious corporate governance, and based on the concept of distribution fairness, corporate governance as a distribution mechanism, giving full play to its unique role and effective path in building a harmonious society, is one of the biggest features of this research result, thus filling the gap in the research of corporate governance in this regard. A harmonious society is a social form with peaceful interpersonal relations, and the key to peaceful interpersonal relations is that all stakeholder groups can obtain channels for expression, can exert their influence, and society has a mechanism to ensure that they express and exert influence and can eventually balance. From the national point of view, the pluralistic interests can be achieved through the establishment of people's congresses, social political parties, and other models of joint participation. However, as a micro-level enterprise, in the traditional internal structure design of corporate governance, the derivative form of "ownership" of capital is the main mode of corporate governance, and it is difficult to establish a multi-interest appeal and influence mechanism such as employee interests and public interests. Based on this concept, the role and influence of non-public enterprise party organizations, trade unions, industry associations, employees and other organizations and stakeholders in corporate governance under this intention were discussed, and the improvement of the remuneration system for executives and employees based on fair distribution was discussed.（AI翻译）