图书简介
This thesis focuses on the Joint liability loan operational mechanism.I applied many kind of discipline such as credit contract theory,game theory,decision theory and information economics theory,etc.,taking farmer Joint liability loan practice in China for example,with the research methods such as combining the normative research with the positive research,combining the qualitative research with the quantitative research,etc.,and have carried out my study on Joint liability loans client screening mechanism,defensive mechanism for moral hazard and its performing incentive mechanism from both the theoretical and the practical aspect.
The main innovations output of this research includes:(1)Client screening mechanism model for Joint liability loans was established and its high operational efficiency was demonstrated.(2)Joint liability loans regulation model for borrowers investing behaviors was established and that “Joint liability,dynamic loaning and risk fund” be hold is the foundation for keeping the mechanism highly operating was demonstrated.(3)Performing incentive model of Joint liability loans was established here,it was proved that the comprehensive governments based on “dynamic incentive,law mechanism and substitute-mortgage” is the key of keeping the performing incentive mechanism running efficiently.
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