在我国经济增长乏力和欧美经济衰退的内外大背景下，中国企业面临着治理转型。随着国家“十二五”战略规划的逐步实施和公司治理机制中不同利益主体代理冲突的演化，作为国民经济支柱的国有企业资本投资效率问题成为治理转型背景下深化国有企业产权制度改革的核心问题。深化国有企业产权制度改革总体要求是必须“突出国有企业的资本属性，引导企业增强价值创造能力和风险控制能力”,“突出主业，有利于提高企业核心竞争能力”。对此，本书所要关注的问题是：影响国有企业资本投资效率的因素究竟是什么？分别是如何影响的？治理转型经济中如何提高国有企业资本投资的效率，促进国有企业增强价值创造能力、风险控制能力和实现可持续增长？对这些问题的解决，符合国家“十二五”关于国有资本优化配置的战略导向和国资委关于投资监管、中央企业考核的政策取向，这正是本书的现实意义所在。

国有企业资本投资战略管理控制问题涉及两个方面：（1）从战略管理角度来说，资本投资后形成的资产作为企业战略实施的载体其基本结构必须与企业的发展战略相吻合。（2）资本投资作为购置和形成企业各类资源和资产的主要财务决策，由于其本身的重要性及其与融资和股利分配决策之间的密切联系，从资本投资视角剖析国有企业内部控制与风险管理问题不仅直击要害，而且为进一步探讨治理模式、管理控制与企业绩效之间的影响机制提供了新的视角。

关于解释国有企业非效率投资的一个广为接受的观点是建立在委托—代理理论基础上的产权改革理论，这方面的已有文献无疑为国有企业资本投资控制这一焦点议题奠定了重要基础。但是，这些文献对于我国治理转型的制度背景、国有企业非效率投资的政府干预因素、集团化的国有企业特征、契约内涵和管理缺陷把握不够全面和深入，不能为资本投资效率提供一个完备的解释框架。

从长远出发，无论是解决国有资产的宏观配置效率问题，还是解决国有企业资源的微观配置效率问题，都需要结合我国治理转型的制度背景，运用制度理论和战略管理理论统揽国有企业资本投资控制的整个全局，并深入探究国有企业资本投资的战略性管理控制系统的构成及运行机制。否则，难以对如何提升国有企业资本投资效率问题做出科学合理的解析。

本书讨论的内容包括：（1）国有企业的契约特性对资本投资效率的影响研究。在全面回顾国有企业产权改革历程及对国有企业契约特性进行剖析和基于契约的资本投资效率的科学内涵进行诠释的基础上，深入分析国有企业的契约特性对资本投资效率的影响机制。（2）国有企业资本投资的战略性财务控制系统构建及其运行机制。构建以国有企业为核心主体，以国家发展改革委、相关部委、国资委、财政部为辅助主体、以政府管制、公司治理控制、管理控制为实现手段，以评价控制、预算控制、激励控制等子系统为中心的国有企业资本投资的自主战略性财务控制系统，并在分析每个子系统包含的范畴及各个子系统之间交互关系的基础上，对国有企业资本投资的自主战略性财务控制系统的作用机理与运行模式进行深入探究。（3）国有企业资本投资的战略性财务控制要处理的关系分析。通过定性与定量相结合的实证研究方法和案例研究方法，寻求国有企业资本投资效率的契约因素和风险因素，检验不同因素对国有企业资本投资效率的影响程度，并进一步挖掘风险管理、价值创造和可持续增长三个方面与资本投资效率的关系。（4）政府管制对国有企业战略性财务控制的作用机理分析。以高管薪酬管制为主的政府管制被认为是解决国有企业资本投资效率的重要手段。本书将深入探究政府管制对国有企业资本投资的作用机理，并通过实证研究分析不同政府管制措施的效率以及对不同类型、不同地区国有企业的影响差异。（5）提升国有企业资本投资效率的战略性财务控制的系统性政策与对策设计。从如何构建国有企业资本投资的自主战略性财务控制系统出发，对通过政府管制、治理控制和管理控制促进提高国有企业资本投资效率，提供系统性的政策与对策设计。（6）针对大型国有企业集团商业模式创新的需求和管理控制的复杂性，强调了治理转型在国有企业商业模式创新中的原动力作用，然后提出从产权和战略双视角来构建双匹配的治理机制，提出了符合国资特性的分层分类治理思路，从行业与管控模式两个维度实施大型多元化国有企业集团管理控制。

本书的章节如下述展开：

首先以战略管理控制视角研究国有企业资本投资效率提升问题为切入点，通过收集国有企业非效率投资影响因素的规范分析结论和经验证据，将问题的核心导向国有企业资本投资效率的有效战略管理控制机制。接下来，第二章从我国国有企业治理转型的发展历程出发，分析了影响国有企业资本投资效率的制度因素，总结了目前研究国有企业资本投资效率影响因素的主要视角，即治理观和战略管理观。第二章制度变迁与非产率投资观，构成了本书的理论基础。

作为国民经济支柱的国有企业资本投资效率是治理转型背景下深化国有企业产权制度改革的核心问题。国有产权作为政府拥有的最直接的利益品，政府作为国家的代理机构，其对国有企业资本投资效率上的影响作用不容忽视。第三章从转轨时期的政企关系出发，探析了政府干预的“支持”之手和“掠夺”行为如何影响国有资本的投资效率。在经济考核机制下，政府的社会性目标以及官员个人私利成为其干预国有企业的主要动因。大股东控股、政治关联则成为政府与国有企业建立联系、进行干预的主要路径。相比之下，政府补贴更是政府的一种直接经济行为，能够直接影响国有企业的财务状况和经营成果。在不同的情况下，政府补贴对国有企业的行为模式选择具有不同的影响。最后，我们从内部治理和外部机制两个角度分析缓解政府不恰当干预的方式。

政府干预究竟是一种中性的手段，还是对企业的“支持”或者“掠夺”？第四章以2007—2011年636家国有上市企业为样本，对政府干预与国有企业非效率投资情况进行更为细致的研究。通过政府层级、地区间差异以及企业政策性负担三个角度对政府干预的动机进行实证分析。与此同时，本章结合企业的投资机会，考察政府补贴这种直接经济干预手段的经济效果，将其加入实证模型。结果发现，政府干预的动机越大，国有企业的非效率投资程度越大。而政府补贴，一方面具有“支持”作用，可以缓解企业投资不足；另一方面在投资机会差的国有企业，拥有补贴的企业具有更为严重的投资过度。这不仅说明了政府的“支持之手”，同时也为“掠夺之手”提供了更为充分的证据。

第五章以2011—2013年沪深两市附属于企业集团的国有上市公司为样本，从集团内部成员企业间现金流的“互动”、集团层面的多元化程度和集团成员企业的金字塔结构三方面探究集团模式运营对成员企业投资及投资效率的影响。研究发现：某一成员企业的投资水平与其自有现金流水平高度相关，但与其他成员企业的现金流水平相关性较弱；多元化程度与投资过度显著正相关，集团层面进行的多元化扩张加重了其成员企业的投资过度水平；金字塔层级与投资过度显著负相关，说明由企业集团层层控制而形成的金字塔层级可以抑制投资过度的发生；多元化水平和金字塔层级都对投资不足没有显著影响。从企业集团视角拓展投资效率影响因素的研究，丰富了新兴市场中企业集团的研究，并为深化国有企业改革提供了政策启示。

第六章利用2007—2011年我国国有上市公司财务报表及其附注中披露的信息，研究了国有企业中的管理层权力、在职消费及其与企业投资效率之间的关系。研究结果表明：管理层权力和在职消费正相关，管理层权力越大的国有企业中，在职消费水平显著更高；国有企业的管理层权力与投资过度正相关，而与投资不足负相关；区分企业控制权发现，中央企业管理者权力所导致的投资过度程度要低于其他国有企业，地方政府控制的国有企业的管理者权力所引起的投资过度程度则显著高于其他国有企业；国有企业中的在职消费与投资过度正相关；中央企业在职消费导致的投资过度程度要低于其他国有企业，而本章并未发现地方政府控制的国有企业的在职消费会引起更严重的投资过度。最后，进一步检验了在职消费与投资不足的关系，发现在职消费对于抑制投资不足程度具有一定的正面影响，在职消费的提高能够降低国有企业的投资不足程度，同时企业的自由现金流越高，在职消费越有助于降低企业的投资不足程度。

第七章从国有企业资本投资效率影响因素的两种主要观点出发，在考虑我国治理转型背景和国有企业特有的契约因素和管理缺陷的基础上，试图构建有效的国有企业资本投资的战略性管控机制，进而达到从战略规划上把握资本投资机会、从战略执行上提高投资收益水平和风险控制能力的目的。全面预算管理作为一种重要的现代企业管理手段，兼具计划、协调、控制、激励和评价等功能，已在我国国有企业中得到较为广泛的应用。中航国际在形式上也已经构建了较为完整的全面预算体系，但在实践中，全面预算管理仍然暴露出指标不够细化、执行缺乏指导性、预算评价体系不够健全等诸多问题，预算管理体系还有待进一步的完善。本章最后从中航国际集团预算的组织体系、预算的编制、预算的分析与控制、预算的考评四个方面入手，详细地分析了公司实施全面预算管理存在的主要问题以及应对措施，以期为提升国有企业集团预算管控功能提供一些有益的启发。

需要指出的是，随着研究的深入和国有企业改革的进一步推进，以及对治理转型视角下国有资本投资效率问题更深层次的理解，发现了更与时俱进的现实问题。2013年中央经济工作会议指出，商业模式创新是化解产能过剩的根本之一。因此，为了化解产能过剩、挖掘国有企业增长潜力与推动经济的可持续增长，创新商业模式成为新一轮大型国有企业改革的方向。而我国大型国有企业集团作为企业组织的高级发展形式，由于产权关系模糊、组织结构复杂、多元化经营甚至跨国经营的现状，制约着经营结构的调整，商业模式创新力明显不足。转型时期的国有企业虽然存在很多治理和管理缺陷，制约着改革之路的前进。与此同时，作为国民经济支柱的大型国有企业集团，是否能够“服务于国家战略目标”，通过治理转型推动商业模式创新以及经济转型成为当下需要解决的关键问题。对这一问题的进一步思考，其结果反映在第八章。

我们认为，商业模式创新成为新一轮国有企业改革的方向，治理转型是大型国有企业集团实现商业模式创新的重要路径。什么样的治理模式有助于大型国有企业集团的商业模式创新？如何权衡产权与战略的关系并厘清大型国有企业集团的治理思路？如何构建有效的管控模式以实现战略价值？为此，第八章首先分析了治理转型在国有企业商业模式创新中的原动力作用；其次，提出从产权和战略双视角来构建双匹配的治理机制，即不仅要从经营层面加强管控并创造价值，而且要从治理层面把握住适应经济形势变革的战略机遇和价值；再次，提出符合国资特性的分层分类治理思路，即对于集团或单个子公司采取分层治理，对于众多子、孙公司采取分类治理；最后，按照产权与战略的划分思路，对于多元化经营、多法人与多层次的企业集团，提出具体可行的思路，即在隐含的产权关系基础上，从行业与管控模式两个维度实施大型多元化国有企业集团管理控制。

特别是战略与治理的结合是大型国有企业集团提升投资效率的有效途径。以产权保护导向的治理结构理应满足战略的需要，但在现实中，战略可能受限于治理结构。企业战略是否适应治理结构的需要、企业管理控制模式是否与治理结构和战略相匹配，是大型国有企业集团价值创造与可持续发展的真正原因。因此，大型国有企业集团可在业务单元投资层面上追求股东价值和企业价值，在集团层面上构建战略价值。这样，通过建立一种产权和战略双匹配的治理机制，大型国有企业集团一方面可从经营层面加强管控并创造价值，另一方面可从治理层面把握住适应经济形势变革的战略机遇和价值。

本书的主要观点是：（1）由于国有企业特有的契约因素导致的资本投资效率低下是实现国有资本保值增值目标的“瓶颈”，构建战略性的财务控制系统是使国有企业“突出主业，以利于提高核心竞争能力和可持续发展”的关键所在。（2）根据宏微观视角划分的控制主体为处于国有资本配置过程中的相关者界定了权责利益导向。发展改革委为国有资本投资提供了国有资本优化配置的战略目标导向，国资委为国有企业资本投资提供了投资监管和业绩考核。财政部为国有企业资本投资的相关人提供了行为导向和规范。国家发展改革委、国资委和财政部是给国有企业资本投资施加战略性财务控制的“施压方”，国有企业自身是资本投资战略性财务控制的“主动方”。（3）资本投资控制具有战略性、平衡性与全程性的特点，必须从财务绩效、价值创造和公司战略的路径出发。战略性财务控制要处理的关系：从财务战略角度，管理增长；从价值创造角度，追求回报；从财务绩效角度，风险管理。（4）战略性财务控制模式应包括制度控制（属于规则控制）、预算控制（属于过程控制）、评价控制（属于目标控制）和激励控制（属于利益控制）。（5）为构建国有企业资本投资的战略性财务控制系统，必须站在战略的高度，因为公司战略决定资本投资决策的方向，资本投资是实现战略规划的根本途径，战略执行需要将战略转化为利益相关者公认的可操作性的企业价值创造层面，使企业组织流程与战略协同，将战略转化为系统的流程，并落实到资本投资项目实施的每一个环节（预算控制——属于过程控制），根据财务绩效考评（评价控制——属于目标控制，缺少过程控制）进行激励与约束（激励控制——属于利益控制）。（6）构建国有企业资本投资的战略性财务控制系统，应立足于中国国情，不能盲目照搬他国经验，并应建立系统的政策体系以确保其运作效率。

本书对上述问题进行了有益的思考和探索，从治理转型视角对国有企业非效率投资的战略性管控机制问题形成了初步研究成果和个人观点，其学术价值和社会影响还有待于进一步观察。真诚地期望读者提出宝贵的意见，以使国有企业非效率投资的战略性管控问题的研究得以进一步深入。

本书由大连市人民政府资助出版。

Under the background of China's weak economic growth and economic recession in Europe and the United States, Chinese enterprises are facing governance transformation. With the gradual implementation of the national "Twelfth Five-Year Plan" strategic plan and the evolution of agency conflicts between different stakeholders in the corporate governance mechanism, the capital investment efficiency of state-owned enterprises as the pillar of the national economy has become the core issue of deepening the reform of the property rights system of state-owned enterprises under the background of governance transformation. The overall requirement for deepening the reform of the property rights system of state-owned enterprises is that it is necessary to "highlight the capital attributes of state-owned enterprises, guide enterprises to enhance their value creation capabilities and risk control capabilities", and "highlight the main business, which is conducive to improving the core competitiveness of enterprises". In this regard, the question that this book will focus on is: What are the factors affecting the capital investment efficiency of state-owned enterprises? How are they affected? How to improve the efficiency of capital investment of state-owned enterprises in the governance transition economy, and promote the enhancement of value creation, risk control and sustainable growth of state-owned enterprises? The solution to these problems is in line with the strategic orientation of the national "Twelfth Five-Year Plan" on the optimal allocation of state-owned capital and the policy orientation of the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission on investment supervision and central enterprise assessment, which is the practical significance of this book. The issue of strategic management and control of capital investment of state-owned enterprises involves two aspects: (1) From the perspective of strategic management, the assets formed after capital investment as the carrier of enterprise strategy implementation, and their basic structure must be consistent with the development strategy of the enterprise. (2) As the main financial decision to purchase and form various resources and assets of enterprises, capital investment is not only to the point from the perspective of capital investment, but also provides a new perspective for further exploring the influence mechanism between governance model, management control and enterprise performance. A widely accepted view on explaining the inefficient investment of state-owned enterprises is the theory of property rights reform based on the principal-agent theory, and the existing literature on this area undoubtedly lays an important foundation for the focus topic of capital investment control of state-owned enterprises. However, these documents do not have a comprehensive and in-depth grasp of the institutional background of China's governance transformation, the government intervention factors of inefficient investment of state-owned enterprises, the characteristics of collectivized state-owned enterprises, the connotation of contracts, and the management defects, and cannot provide a complete interpretation framework for the efficiency of capital investment. In the long run, whether it is to solve the problem of macro-allocation efficiency of state-owned assets or the micro-allocation efficiency of state-owned enterprise resources, it is necessary to combine the institutional background of China's governance transformation, use institutional theory and strategic management theory to control the entire overall situation of capital investment control of state-owned enterprises, and deeply explore the composition and operation mechanism of the strategic management and control system of capital investment of state-owned enterprises. Otherwise, it is difficult to make a scientific and reasonable analysis of how to improve the capital investment efficiency of state-owned enterprises. The contents discussed in this book include: (1) Research on the impact of the contractual characteristics of state-owned enterprises on the efficiency of capital investment. On the basis of comprehensively reviewing the reform of property rights of state-owned enterprises, analyzing the contractual characteristics of state-owned enterprises and interpreting the scientific connotation of contract-based capital investment efficiency, this paper analyzes the influence mechanism of contractual characteristics of state-owned enterprises on capital investment efficiency. (2) Construction and operation mechanism of strategic financial control system for capital investment of state-owned enterprises. Build an independent strategic financial control system for capital investment of state-owned enterprises with state-owned enterprises as the core subject, the National Development and Reform Commission, relevant ministries and commissions, the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission and the Ministry of Finance as auxiliary subjects, government control, corporate governance control and management control as the means, and evaluation control, budget control, incentive control and other subsystems as the center, and on the basis of analyzing the scope contained in each subsystem and the interaction relationship between each subsystem. The mechanism and operation mode of the independent strategic financial control system of capital investment of state-owned enterprises were deeply explored. (3) Analysis of the relationship to be handled by the strategic financial control of capital investment of state-owned enterprises. Through the empirical research methods and case study methods combining qualitative and quantitative, the contractual factors and risk factors of the capital investment efficiency of state-owned enterprises are sought, the influence of different factors on the capital investment efficiency of state-owned enterprises is examined, and the relationship between risk management, value creation and sustainable growth and capital investment efficiency is further explored. (4) Analysis of the mechanism of government regulation on the strategic financial control of state-owned enterprises. Government regulation, mainly the regulation of executive compensation, is considered to be an important means to solve the capital investment efficiency of state-owned enterprises. This book will deeply explore the mechanism of government regulation on the capital investment of state-owned enterprises, and analyze the efficiency of different government regulatory measures and the differences in the impact of different types and regions of state-owned enterprises through empirical research. (5) Design of systematic policies and countermeasures for strategic financial control to improve the efficiency of capital investment in state-owned enterprises. Starting from how to build an independent strategic financial control system for capital investment of state-owned enterprises, this paper provides systematic policy and countermeasure design for promoting the improvement of capital investment efficiency of state-owned enterprises through government control, governance control and management control. (6) Aiming at the needs of business model innovation of large state-owned enterprise groups and the complexity of management control, the role of governance transformation in the business model innovation of state-owned enterprises is emphasized, and then a double-matching governance mechanism is proposed from the dual perspectives of property rights and strategy, and a hierarchical and categorical governance idea that conforms to the characteristics of state-owned assets is proposed, and the management and control of large-scale diversified state-owned enterprise groups are implemented from the two dimensions of industry and control mode. The chapters of this book are as follows: firstly, from the perspective of strategic management control, the problem of improving the efficiency of capital investment in state-owned enterprises is studied as the starting point, and by collecting normative analysis conclusions and empirical evidence of the influencing factors of non-efficient investment of state-owned enterprises, the core of the problem is oriented to the effective strategic management control mechanism of capital investment efficiency of state-owned enterprises. Next, starting from the development process of the governance transformation of state-owned enterprises in China, the second chapter analyzes the institutional factors affecting the capital investment efficiency of state-owned enterprises, and summarizes the main perspectives that currently study the influencing factors of capital investment efficiency of state-owned enterprises, namely governance view and strategic management view. Chapter 2, Institutional Change and the View of Non-Productive Investment, forms the theoretical basis of this book. As the pillar of the national economy, the capital investment efficiency of state-owned enterprises is the core issue of deepening the reform of the property rights system of state-owned enterprises under the background of governance transformation. As the most direct interest of the government, state-owned property rights and the government, as an agency of the state, have an impact on the capital investment efficiency of state-owned enterprises cannot be ignored. Chapter 3 explores how the "supportive" hand and "plundering" behavior of government intervention affect the investment efficiency of state-owned capital from the perspective of the relationship between government and enterprises during the transition period. Under the economic evaluation mechanism, the government's social goals and officials' personal interests become the main motivations for their intervention in state-owned enterprises. Major shareholder holding and political connections have become the main ways for the government to establish ties and intervene with state-owned enterprises. In contrast, government subsidies are a direct economic behavior of the government, which can directly affect the financial status and operating results of state-owned enterprises. Under different circumstances, government subsidies have different impacts on the behavior pattern choices of state-owned enterprises. Finally, we analyze the ways to mitigate inappropriate government intervention from two perspectives: internal governance and external mechanisms. Is government intervention a neutral tactic, or is it "support" or "plunder" of businesses? Chapter 4 takes a sample of 636 listed state-owned enterprises from 2007 to 2011 as a sample to conduct a more detailed study of government intervention and inefficient investment by state-owned enterprises. This paper empirically analyzes the motivation of government intervention from three perspectives: government level, regional differences, and corporate policy burden. At the same time, this chapter examines the economic effects of government subsidies as a direct means of economic intervention in the context of firms' investment opportunities and adds them to empirical models. It was found that the greater the incentive for government intervention, the greater the degree of inefficient investment in state-owned enterprises. Government subsidies, on the one hand, have a "support" effect, which can alleviate the lack of investment of enterprises; On the other hand, in state-owned enterprises with poor investment opportunities, enterprises with subsidies have a more serious overinvestment. This not only illustrates the government's "hand of support", but also provides more evidence of the "hand of predation". Chapter 5 takes the state-owned listed companies affiliated with enterprise groups in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2011 to 2013 as a sample, and explores the impact of group model operation on the investment and investment efficiency of member enterprises from three aspects: the "interaction" of cash flow among member enterprises within the group, the degree of diversification at the group level and the pyramid structure of the group member enterprises. It is found that the investment level of a member enterprise is highly correlated with its own cash flow level, but the correlation with the cash flow level of other member enterprises is weak. The degree of diversification is significantly positively correlated with overinvestment, and the diversification expansion at the group level aggravates the level of overinvestment of its member companies; The pyramid level is significantly negatively correlated with excessive investment, indicating that the pyramid level formed by the control of enterprise groups can inhibit the occurrence of excessive investment. Neither the level of diversification nor the pyramid level had a significant effect on underinvestment. From the perspective of enterprise groups, the research on the influencing factors of investment efficiency enriches the research of enterprise groups in emerging markets and provides policy enlightenment for deepening the reform of state-owned enterprises. Chapter 6 uses the information disclosed in the financial statements and notes of China's state-owned listed companies from 2007 to 2011 to study the relationship between management power, on-the-job consumption and the investment efficiency of enterprises in state-owned enterprises. The results show that management power and on-the-job consumption are positively correlated, and the level of on-the-job consumption is significantly higher in state-owned enterprises with greater management power. The management power of state-owned enterprises is positively correlated with overinvestment and negatively correlated with underinvestment; Distinguishing the control of enterprises, it is found that the degree of overinvestment caused by the power of managers of central enterprises is lower than that of other state-owned enterprises, and the degree of overinvestment caused by the power of managers of state-owned enterprises controlled by local governments is significantly higher than that of other state-owned enterprises. On-the-job consumption in state-owned enterprises is positively correlated with excessive investment; On-the-job consumption in central SOEs leads to a lower degree of overinvestment than other SOEs, and this chapter does not find that on-the-job consumption in local government-controlled SOEs leads to more serious overinvestment. Finally, the relationship between on-the-job consumption and underinvestment is further examined, and it is found that on-the-job consumption has a certain positive impact on curbing the degree of underinvestment, and the increase of on-the-job consumption can reduce the degree of underinvestment of state-owned enterprises, and the higher the free cash flow of enterprises, the more in-service consumption helps to reduce the degree of underinvestment of enterprises. Chapter 7 starts from the two main perspectives of the influencing factors of capital investment efficiency of state-owned enterprises, and on the basis of considering the background of China's governance transformation and the unique contractual factors and management defects of state-owned enterprises, attempts to build an effective strategic control mechanism for capital investment of state-owned enterprises, so as to achieve the purpose of grasping capital investment opportunities from strategic planning and improving the level of investment returns and risk control capabilities from the perspective of strategy implementation. As an important modern enterprise management method, comprehensive budget management has the functions of planning, coordination, control, incentive and evaluation, and has been widely used in China's state-owned enterprises. AVIC International has also built a relatively complete comprehensive budget system in form, but in practice, comprehensive budget management still exposes many problems such as insufficient detailed indicators, lack of guidance in implementation, and insufficient budget evaluation system, and the budget management system needs to be further improved. Finally, this chapter analyzes in detail the main problems and countermeasures of AVIC International Group's budget organization system, budget preparation, budget analysis and control, and budget evaluation, in order to provide some useful inspiration for improving the budget control function of state-owned enterprise groups. It should be pointed out that with the deepening of research and the further advancement of state-owned enterprise reform, as well as a deeper understanding of the efficiency of state-owned capital investment from the perspective of governance transformation, more practical problems that keep pace with the times have been discovered. The 2013 Central Economic Work Conference pointed out that business model innovation is one of the fundamental solutions to overcapacity. Therefore, in order to resolve overcapacity, tap the growth potential of state-owned enterprises and promote sustainable economic growth, innovative business models have become the direction of a new round of reform of large state-owned enterprises. However, as an advanced form of development of enterprise organizations, China's large state-owned enterprise groups restrict the adjustment of business structure due to the current situation of ambiguous property rights relations, complex organizational structure, diversified operation and even transnational operation, and the innovation of business models is obviously insufficient. Although state-owned enterprises in the transition period have many governance and management deficiencies, which restrict the progress of reform. At the same time, whether large state-owned enterprise groups, which are the pillars of the national economy, can "serve the national strategic goals", promote business model innovation and economic transformation through governance transformation have become key issues that need to be solved at present. The results of further reflection on this issue are reflected in chapter VIII. We believe that business model innovation has become the direction of a new round of SOE reform, and governance transformation is an important path for large SOE groups to achieve business model innovation. What kind of governance model is conducive to the business model innovation of large SOE groups? How to balance the relationship between property rights and strategy and clarify the governance thinking of large state-owned enterprise groups? How to build an effective governance model to achieve strategic value? To this end, Chapter 8 first analyzes the driving force role of governance transformation in the business model innovation of state-owned enterprises. Secondly, it proposes to build a double-matching governance mechanism from the dual perspectives of property rights and strategy, that is, it is not only necessary to strengthen control and create value from the operational level, but also to grasp the strategic opportunities and values that adapt to the changes in the economic situation from the governance level; Thirdly, the idea of hierarchical and categorical governance in line with the characteristics of state-owned assets is proposed, that is, hierarchical governance is adopted for groups or individual subsidiaries, and classified governance is adopted for many descendants and grandchildren. Finally, according to the idea of dividing property rights and strategy, specific and feasible ideas are put forward for diversified operation, multi-legal person and multi-level enterprise groups, that is, on the basis of the implied property rights relationship, the management and control of large-scale diversified state-owned enterprise groups are implemented from the two dimensions of industry and control mode. In particular, the combination of strategy and governance is an effective way for large state-owned enterprise groups to improve investment efficiency. A property rights protection-oriented governance structure should meet the needs of the strategy, but in reality, the strategy may be limited by the governance structure. Whether the enterprise strategy meets the needs of the governance structure and whether the enterprise management control mode matches the governance structure and strategy are the real reasons for the value creation and sustainable development of large state-owned enterprise groups. Therefore, large state-owned enterprise groups can pursue shareholder value and enterprise value at the business unit investment level, and build strategic value at the group level. In this way, by establishing a governance mechanism that matches property rights and strategy, large state-owned enterprise groups can strengthen control and create value from the operational level on the one hand, and grasp the strategic opportunities and value that adapt to changes in the economic situation from the governance level on the other hand. The main points of this book are: (1) The inefficiency of capital investment caused by the unique contractual factors of state-owned enterprises is the "bottleneck" to achieve the goal of preserving and increasing the value of state-owned capital, and building a strategic financial control system is the key to making state-owned enterprises "highlight their main business to help improve their core competitiveness and sustainable development". (2) The controlling entity divided according to the macro and micro perspectives defines the rights, responsibilities and benefit orientation of the relevant parties in the process of state-owned capital allocation. The Development and Reform Commission provides strategic goal guidance for the optimal allocation of state-owned capital for state-owned capital investment, and the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission provides investment supervision and performance assessment for state-owned enterprise capital investment. The Ministry of Finance provides behavioral guidance and norms for those involved in capital investment in state-owned enterprises. The National Development and Reform Commission, the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission and the Ministry of Finance are the "pressure parties" to exert strategic financial control over the capital investment of state-owned enterprises, and the state-owned enterprises themselves are the "active parties" of the strategic financial control of capital investment. (3) Capital investment control is strategic, balanced and whole-process, and must start from the path of financial performance, value creation and corporate strategy. Relationships to be handled by strategic financial control: managing growth from a financial strategic perspective; From the perspective of value creation, pursue returns; Risk management from a financial performance perspective. (4) The strategic financial control model should include system control (belonging to rule control), budget control (belonging to process control), evaluation control (belonging to target control) and incentive control (belonging to interest control). (5) In order to build a strategic financial control system for capital investment of state-owned enterprises, it is necessary to stand at a strategic height, because the company's strategy determines the direction of capital investment decisions, capital investment is the fundamental way to achieve strategic planning, and strategic implementation needs to transform strategy into the enterprise value creation level recognized by stakeholders as operable, so that the enterprise organizational process and strategy are coordinated, the strategy is transformed into a systematic process, and implemented in every link of the implementation of capital investment projects (budget control - belongs to process control), Incentives and constraints (incentive control - interest control) according to financial performance appraisal (evaluation control - belongs to target control, lack of process control). (6) The construction of a strategic financial control system for capital investment of state-owned enterprises should be based on China's national conditions, should not blindly copy the experience of other countries, and should establish a systematic policy system to ensure its operational efficiency. This book provides useful thinking and exploration on the above issues, and forms preliminary research results and personal views on the strategic control mechanism of inefficient investment of state-owned enterprises from the perspective of governance transformation, and its academic value and social impact need to be further observed. I sincerely hope that readers will put forward valuable opinions so that the research on the strategic control of inefficient investment in state-owned enterprises can be further deepened. This book is funded and published by the Dalian Municipal People's Government.（AI翻译）