摘要：2016年上半年在积极的财政政策、宽松的货币政策以及房地产新政的作用下，中国宏观经济在持续探底中开始呈现企稳的迹象，CPI重返“2时代”、PPI负增长的大幅度收窄、企业利润增速的转正以及房地产类数据的反弹都表明中国宏观经济并不存在“硬着陆”的可能。2016年上半年出现了一系列值得关注的新现象：1.“去产能”还在布局阶段，过剩行业产品价格却开始出现大幅度波动；2.三四线房地产“去库存”还没有开始，一二线房地产价格却出现全面上扬；3.对“僵尸企业”和高债务企业的整治还没有实质性展开，大量高负债国有企业却已经大规模进军土地市场、海外并购市场和金融投资市场；4.“去杠杆”各类举措刚开始布局，但宏观债务率却持续上扬，部分指标已经大大超过警戒线；5.“降成本”如火如荼地展开，但各类宏观税负指标却在持续加重，企业总体盈利能力持续下滑；6.房地产投资增速超预期反弹，各类新开工项目大幅度上扬，但民间投资增速却直线回落；7.M2增速保持稳定，但M1增速却出现持续上扬，M1-M2缺口持续扩大；8.居民收入增速持续超过GDP增速，但劳动力生产率以及企业盈利能力却出现持续下滑；9.对外投资增速急剧上扬，但出口增速却持续低迷；10.各类技术指标进步神速，新经济增长动力开始显现，但总体劳动生产效率却依然处于持续下滑的区间；11.工业等传统行业有所企稳，但服务业和新兴行业却开始呈现疲态；12.政策类投资增速回升，但消费却出现持续回落。这12大现象充分说明了中国宏观经济运行依然面临四大方面的问题：一是供给侧结构性改革的着力点还没有完全找到；二是稳增长政策并没有缓解宏观经济深层次问题，反而使各类扭曲大幅度上扬，资源配置的效率持续恶化，经济主体的信心没有得到改善；三是经济回落的负反馈机制开始发生变化，经济内生性下滑的压力有所加剧，“生产效率预期下滑”+“投资收益预期下滑”+“收入增速预期下滑”所带来的市场型投资疲软和消费疲软开始向深度蔓延。短期产出与中期潜在产出的负向强化机制、超国民收入分配所带来的“消费—投资”困局、实体经济与虚拟经济相对收益下滑所带来的进一步“脱实向虚”等三大新难题已经成为中国宏观经济摆脱持续探底困境的核心障碍；四是当前宏观经济的短期企稳构建在大规模政策宽松和泡沫化房地产复苏之上，实体经济与虚拟经济之间的分化决定了中国宏观经济还没有形成持续稳定或复苏的基础。2016年下半年，中国宏观经济难以持续上半年企稳的态势。外部经济波动的重现、内部扭曲的强化、金融风险的不断累计与间断性释放、结构性改革的全面实施等方面的因素决定了中国宏观经济下行压力的进一步抬头。而与此同时，政策刺激效率的递减和房地产泡沫的管控决定了经济政策的对冲效应将大幅度下降。因此，本轮“不对称W型调整”的第二个底部将于2016年年底至2017年年初出现，并呈现出强劲的底部波动的特征。根据模型预测，2016年中国GDP增速为6.6%，CPI增速为2.3%。报告指出，2016—2017年是中国实施供给侧结构性改革的关键期，“大改革”+“更为积极的财政政策”+“适度宽松的货币政策”+“强监管”必须要有可操作的抓手和可实施的方案，各类改革方案和政策措施必须做出新的调整。

Abstract: In the first half of 2016, under the role of active fiscal policy, loose monetary policy and new real estate policy, China's macroeconomy began to show signs of stabilization in the continuous bottoming, CPI returned to the "2 era", the negative growth of PPI narrowed sharply, the growth rate of corporate profits turned positive and the rebound of real estate data all indicate that China's macroeconomy does not have the possibility of a "hard landing". The first half of 2016 saw a number of noteworthy new phenomena: 1. "capacity reduction" is still in the layout stage, but the price of products in excess industries has begun to fluctuate sharply; 2. The "destocking" of third- and fourth-tier real estate has not yet begun, but the prices of first- and second-tier real estate have risen across the board; 3. The rectification of "zombie enterprises" and high-debt enterprises has not yet been substantially carried out, but a large number of highly indebted state-owned enterprises have entered the land market, overseas mergers and acquisitions market and financial investment market on a large scale; 4. Various measures of "deleveraging" have just begun to be deployed, but the macro debt ratio has continued to rise, and some indicators have greatly exceeded the warning line; 5. "Cost reduction" is in full swing, but various macro tax indicators continue to increase, and the overall profitability of enterprises continues to decline; 6. The growth rate of real estate investment rebounded beyond expectations, and various newly started projects rose sharply, but the growth rate of private investment fell sharply; 7. The growth rate of M2 remained stable, but the growth rate of M1 continued to rise, and the gap between M1 and M2 continued to expand; 8. The growth rate of household income continues to exceed the GDP growth rate, but labor productivity and corporate profitability continue to decline; 9. The growth rate of foreign investment has risen sharply, but the growth rate of exports has remained sluggish; 10. Various technical indicators have made rapid progress, and new economic growth momentum has begun to appear, but the overall labor production efficiency is still in the range of continuous decline; 11. Traditional industries such as industry have stabilized, but service and emerging industries have begun to show weakness; 12. The growth rate of policy-based investment has rebounded, but consumption has continued to decline. These 12 major phenomena fully illustrate that China's macroeconomic operation is still facing four major problems: first, the focus of supply-side structural reform has not been fully found; Second, the steady growth policy has not alleviated the deep-seated macroeconomic problems, but has caused various distortions to rise sharply, the efficiency of resource allocation has continued to deteriorate, and the confidence of economic entities has not improved; Third, the negative feedback mechanism of the economic downturn has begun to change, and the pressure of endogenous economic decline has intensified, and the market-oriented investment weakness and consumption weakness caused by "expected decline in production efficiency" + "expected decline in investment income" + "expected decline in income growth" have begun to spread deeply. Three new problems, namely the negative strengthening mechanism of short-term output and medium-term potential output, the "consumption-investment" dilemma brought about by the distribution of supranational income, and the further "dematerialization to virtuality" brought about by the decline in the relative returns of the real economy and the virtual economy have become the core obstacles for China's macroeconomy to get rid of the dilemma of continuous bottoming. Fourth, the current short-term macroeconomic stabilization is built on large-scale policy easing and bubble real estate recovery, and the differentiation between the real economy and the virtual economy determines that China's macroeconomy has not yet formed a foundation for sustained stability or recovery. In the second half of 2016, it was difficult for China's macroeconomy to continue to stabilize in the first half of the year. The reappearance of external economic fluctuations, the strengthening of internal distortions, the continuous accumulation and intermittent release of financial risks, and the comprehensive implementation of structural reforms have determined the further rise of China's macroeconomic downward pressure. At the same time, the diminishing efficiency of policy stimulus and the control of the real estate bubble determine that the hedging effect of economic policies will be greatly reduced. Therefore, the second bottom of this round of "asymmetric W-shaped adjustment" will appear in late 2016 and early 2017 and will be characterized by strong bottom fluctuations. According to the model, China's GDP growth rate in 2016 will be 6.6%, and CPI growth rate will be 2.3%. The report pointed out that 2016-2017 is a critical period for China's implementation of supply-side structural reform, and "major reform" + "more active fiscal policy" + "moderately loose monetary policy" + "strong supervision" must have operable grips and implementable plans, and various reform programs and policy measures must make new adjustments.（AI翻译）