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中国风电和光伏发电补贴政策研究

Trans for ming Rexewable Subsidy Policies for wind and Solar Power in China

ISBN:978-7-5203-2697-1

出版日期:2018-10

页数:343

字数:239.0千字

丛书名:《北京大学国家发展研究院智库丛书》

点击量:9210次

定价:89.00元

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基金信息: 北京大学国家发展研究院腾讯基金 展开

图书简介

自2006年1月颁布《可再生能源法》以来,中国风电和光伏发电以世所罕见的速度迅猛发展,在取得亮眼成绩的同时,也面临诸多挑战。其中尤为突出的是:可再生能源发电的补贴资金缺口急剧膨胀;“弃风弃光”比例不断攀升。

回顾历史,审视当下,本书在实地调研基础上提出分析和建议。我们发现,分别始于2009年和2011年出台的风电和光伏发电固定上网电价制度,虽然在较短的时间内迅速推动风电和光伏发电装机的大规模发展,对中国能源绿色转型起到关键性作用,但在风电和光伏发电成本大幅度下降的背景下,却因电价调整的严重缓慢和滞后,导致补贴额度过高,高度激发市场投资意愿,催生5万千瓦光伏项目指标“黑市”价可达2000万元的寻租乱象。除引发市场主体的投资冲动,补贴成本由全国电价共同分担的政策设计,也在制度层面上形成“地方请客、中央埋单”的资源配置逻辑,触发地方政府的投资饥渴和行政干预,为中国风电和光伏发电的发展埋下了“重建设、轻消纳”的隐患。

高额补贴所引爆的风电和光伏发电投资,不但给财政补贴资金造成巨大压力,也与中国原有僵化的电力体制产生种种摩擦和矛盾,促发罕见的弃风弃光问题。在现有电力体制下,电力传输和交易以省为界、“画地为牢”,跨省交易困难重重,严重阻碍风电和光伏发电的外送消纳。在经济下行、省内工业用电需求大幅度下滑的背景下,三北地区的弃风弃光问题因此而首当其冲。更深层次的问题是,固定上网电价结合全额保障性收购的政策设计虽欲以“既保价、又保量”的初衷推动可再生能源的大规模发展,但经济规律表明“量”“价”难两全:给定固定上网电价,只要新建装机就能获得超额回报率,即便弃风弃光率不断攀升,企业也会不断增加投资,直到项目收益趋向行业平均回报率。在封闭且需求有限的市场中,高额补贴成为高弃风弃光率的最直接推手,而弃风弃光率则替代价格成为调节市场供给的重要工具,且随补贴强度水涨船高。

近年来,中国经济和环境污染形势再次发生重大变化。为此,有必要重新审视、冷静分析当前新形势,选择切实可行的政策思路。我们的分析表明,在当前的新形势下,曾经催生风电和光伏发电高额补贴政策的历史因素已经发生变化。而可再生能源发展的国际经验表明,上网电价竞标制度以其独有的市场化配置资源的方式以及真实发现和还原发电成本的优势受到越来越多的国家的欢迎和采用。我们认为,解决当前风电和光伏发电所面临的问题,并促进其长久可持续发展,第一要还原风电和光伏发电的商品和环境属性,第二要让市场和环境成为配置稀缺清洁能源的决定性力量。我们要摆脱以往补贴思维的惯性,让补贴政策回归它的环境宗旨:从减少大气污染和二氧化碳减排的环境角度,而不是为完成某种发展目标、某种占比的角度,制定合理的补贴政策。尤其要抑制为完成任务不顾实际、不惜代价、操之过急的政策倾向。

在讨论可选政策的基础上,本书提出以下建议:

1.在中长期,以开征环境税为契机取消对新增装机的发电补贴。我们建议,充分利用环境税的“双重红利”,在降低其他税赋、维持税收总量大体不变的前提下,开征燃煤发电大气污染物排放和碳排放的环境税(或碳税),并在对已建成的存量风电和光伏发电项目按原有合同继续补贴直至补贴期满的同时,适时取消新增装机的发电补贴。

2.在短期,迎难而上、及时果断调整现有高额补贴政策。我们建议在未来环境税和碳交易市场都全面推行的情形下,设置一个补贴过渡期:在此过渡期内,对新增装机沿用既有补贴政策框架,但需对补贴政策做大幅度调整;过渡期满,取消对新增装机的发电补贴,对已建成的存量风电和光伏发电项目则按原有合同继续补贴直至补贴期满。但在补贴政策退出之前,需对补贴做法做如下大幅度调整:(1)努力扩大上网电价竞标项目范围。建议在每年的全国装机容量指标中,划出部分比例供在全国范围内实施上网电价竞标,且面向全国各省进行统一竞标。(2)对于不纳入竞标的风电和光伏发电项目,我们建议:(a)先挂钩各资源区上一年度平均弃风弃光率水平,依据资源区内平均弃风弃光率越高、下调幅度亦越高的原则,一次性大幅度下调现有新建项目上网价格,以约束高弃风弃光率省份政府和企业的投资冲动;(b)增加新建风电和光伏发电标杆上网电价的调整频率,可考虑根据新增装机规模或弃风弃光率进行每年一次的调整;(c)充分利用价格工具调整全国风电和光伏发电项目新增建设规模,并适时取消年度装机容量计划指标管制。

3.基于“谁受益、谁付费”的原则以及减少电价交叉补贴的考虑,建议对居民用电全额征收每千瓦时1.9分的可再生能源电价附加,以应对不断增加的补贴缺口。

4.制定合理、切实可行的最低保障利用小时数,促进风电和光伏发电参与电力市场交易。我们建议,先由国家能源局制定各省风电和光伏发电占全省可调发电量15%的最低比例。对于风电和光伏发电占比尚未达到该最低比例的省份,由电网公司对省内风电和光伏发电进行全额保障性收购;对于风电和光伏发电占比超过该最低比例的省份,则可进一步考虑:(1)比例内的发电总量,按现有办法根据风电和光伏发电装机容量进行等比例分配,并以此作为制定各省风电和光伏发电最低保障利用小时数的依据;(2)比例外的风电和光伏发电则参与市场交易。

5.加快电力市场改革,释放风电和光伏发电的竞争优势。电力市场的有效运行是发展风电和光伏发电、消纳间歇不稳定电力的重要保障。我们建议:(1)先由中央政府协调推动,破除电力市场交易的省际壁垒,在更大范围内建立统一的电力交易市场,扩大电力平衡范围和跨省跨区交易规模;(2)加快建立电力现货交易市场,发挥风电和光伏发电零边际成本的竞争优势,以市场手段促进风电和光伏发电的全额消纳;(3)建立调峰调频辅助服务交易,让风电和光伏发电企业通过向其他电源购买调峰调频辅助服务来解决其间歇性和不稳定性问题。

6.谨慎对待非水可再生能源配额制度。在电力市场严重分割、风电和光伏发电难以跨省消纳的背景下,有关政策制定方寄希望于尽快出台以省为单位的可再生能源配额制度,促进风电和光伏发电的跨省购售电交易。但是,我们认为当前出台非水可再生能源配额制度的条件尚不成熟。首先,可再生能源配额和上网电价分别代表数量控制政策和价格控制政策,两项政策不能同时叠加执行,否则市场无法出清。其次,只要发电权掌握在省政府手中,贸然推进可再生能源配额制度并将完成配额的义务落在发电企业身上,未必如政策设计初衷所愿能打破省际壁垒、促进风电和光伏发电的跨省购售电交易。最后,如果一定要推行非水可再生能源配额制,也应在条件成熟地区先行先试。尤其是河北、河南、北京、天津和山东五省市,不但是中国大气污染问题最为严重地区,而且在地理位置上相邻,最有条件成为非水可再生能源配额制先行试点地区。

我们认为,在充分尊重产业发展规律的前提下,制定稳步务实的补贴政策,是实现风电和光伏发电可持续发展的重要保障。随着技术的进步和成本的不断降低,风电和光伏发电最终将摆脱补贴、凭借成本优势在发电市场中获得一席之位。我们相信,只要能秉持党的十八届三中全会全面深化改革以来所提出的,还原能源商品属性并让市场在资源配置中起决定性作用的改革原则,并立足于发展风电和光伏发电的环境初衷,在当前新型经济和环境形势下,实事求是,重新制定适宜的补贴政策、大力推进电力市场化改革,中国风电和光伏发电一定能实现长远可持续发展,并成为中国发电领域的重要组成部分。

Since the promulgation of the Renewable Energy Law in January 2006, China's wind power and photovoltaic power generation have developed at a speed rarely seen in the world, and while achieving outstanding results, it also faces many challenges. In particular, the gap in subsidy funding for renewable energy generation has ballooned; The proportion of "abandoning wind and abandoning light" is rising. Looking back at history and examining the present, this book provides analysis and recommendations based on field research. We find that the fixed on-grid tariff system for wind power and photovoltaic power generation, which began in 2009 and 2011 respectively, although the rapid promotion of large-scale development of wind power and photovoltaic power generation installed capacity in a relatively short period of time plays a key role in China's green energy transformation, but in the context of the sharp decline in the cost of wind power and photovoltaic power generation, due to the serious slowness and lag of electricity price adjustment, resulting in too high subsidy amount, highly stimulating market investment willingness, and giving birth to a "black market" of 50,000 kilowatt photovoltaic project indicators The price can reach 20 million yuan of rent-seeking chaos. In addition to triggering the investment impulse of market players, the policy design of subsidy costs shared by the national electricity price also forms a resource allocation logic of "local invitations and central payments" at the institutional level, triggering local governments' investment hunger and administrative intervention, and laying hidden dangers of "heavy construction and light consumption" for the development of China's wind power and photovoltaic power generation. The investment in wind power and photovoltaic power generation triggered by high subsidies not only puts great pressure on financial subsidy funds, but also causes various frictions and contradictions with China's original rigid power system, promoting the rare problem of abandoning wind and light. Under the existing power system, power transmission and trading are bounded by provinces and "drawn as prisons", and cross-provincial transactions are full of difficulties, which seriously hinder the transmission and consumption of wind power and photovoltaic power generation. In the context of the economic downturn and the sharp decline in industrial electricity demand in the province, the problem of abandonment of wind and light in the Sanbei region is therefore the first to bear the brunt. The deeper problem is that although the policy design of fixed feed-in tariff combined with full guaranteed acquisition intends to promote the large-scale development of renewable energy with the original intention of "both price and quantity", economic laws show that "quantity" and "price" are difficult to achieve: given a fixed feed-in tariff, as long as the new installed capacity can obtain excess returns, even if the abandonment rate continues to rise, enterprises will continue to increase investment until the project income tends to the average rate of return in the industry. In a closed market with limited demand, high subsidies have become the most direct driver of high curtailment rate, while curtailment rate has become an important tool to regulate market supply by replacing prices, and it rises with the intensity of subsidies. In recent years, China's economic and environmental pollution situation has undergone major changes again. To this end, it is necessary to re-examine and calmly analyze the current new situation and choose practical policy ideas. Our analysis shows that under the current new situation, the historical factors that once gave rise to high subsidies for wind power and photovoltaic power generation have changed. The international experience of renewable energy development shows that the on-grid tariff bidding system has been welcomed and adopted by more and more countries with its unique market-oriented allocation of resources and the advantages of truly discovering and restoring power generation costs. We believe that to solve the current problems faced by wind power and photovoltaic power generation and promote their long-term sustainable development, the first is to restore the commodity and environmental attributes of wind power and photovoltaic power generation, and the second is to make the market and environment a decisive force for the allocation of scarce clean energy. We must get rid of the inertia of the previous subsidy thinking and return the subsidy policy to its environmental purpose: from the environmental perspective of reducing air pollution and carbon dioxide reduction, rather than from the perspective of achieving a certain development goal and a certain proportion. In particular, it is necessary to curb the tendency of policies to be hasty in order to accomplish tasks without regard for reality, at any cost. Based on the discussion of alternative policies, this book makes the following recommendations: 1. In the medium to long term, the introduction of environmental taxes should be used as an opportunity to eliminate power generation subsidies for new installations. We suggest that we make full use of the "double dividend" of environmental taxes, introduce environmental taxes (or carbon taxes) on air pollutant emissions and carbon emissions from coal-fired power generation on the premise of reducing other taxes and maintaining the total amount of tax revenue, and cancel the power generation subsidies for newly installed capacity in a timely manner while continuing to subsidize existing wind power and photovoltaic power generation projects according to the original contract until the expiration of the subsidy period. 2. In the short term, face difficulties and timely and decisively adjust the existing high-subsidy policy. We propose to set up a subsidy transition period when both environmental taxes and carbon trading markets are fully implemented in the future: during this transition period, the existing subsidy policy framework will be used for new installations, but the subsidy policy will need to be significantly adjusted; Upon the expiration of the transition period, the power generation subsidy for new installations will be cancelled, and the existing wind power and photovoltaic power generation projects that have been completed will continue to subsidize according to the original contract until the subsidy period expires. However, before the subsidy policy is withdrawn, the subsidy practice needs to be significantly adjusted as follows: (1) Efforts should be made to expand the scope of feed-in bidding projects. It is recommended that in the annual national installed capacity index, a part of the proportion is set aside for the implementation of on-grid tariff bidding nationwide, and unified bidding is carried out for all provinces in the country. (2) For wind power and photovoltaic power generation projects that are not included in the bidding, we recommend: (a) first link the average curtailment rate level of each resource area in the previous year, and according to the principle that the higher the average curtailment rate and the higher the downward adjustment range in the resource area, the on-grid price of existing new projects will be significantly reduced at one time to restrain the investment impulse of provincial governments and enterprises with high curtailment rate of wind and curtailment; (b) Increase the frequency of adjustment of the benchmark feed-in tariff for new wind power and photovoltaic power generation, and consider making annual adjustments according to the scale of new installations or the rate of wind and light curtailment; (c) Make full use of price tools to adjust the scale of new construction of wind power and photovoltaic power generation projects nationwide, and cancel the control of annual installed capacity plan indicators in a timely manner. 3. Based on the principle of "who benefits, who pays" and the consideration of reducing cross-subsidy of electricity prices, it is proposed to impose a renewable energy tariff surcharge of 1.9 cents per kWh for the full amount of residential electricity consumption to cope with the increasing subsidy gap. 4. Formulate reasonable and feasible minimum guaranteed utilization hours to promote the participation of wind power and photovoltaic power generation in electricity market transactions. We recommend that the National Energy Administration first set a minimum proportion of 15% of the province's adjustable power generation from wind power and photovoltaic power generation. For provinces where the proportion of wind power and photovoltaic power generation has not reached the minimum proportion, the grid company will make a full guarantee purchase of wind power and photovoltaic power generation in the province; For provinces where the proportion of wind power and photovoltaic power generation exceeds the minimum proportion, further consideration can be given: (1) the total amount of power generation within the proportion shall be allocated in equal proportions according to the installed capacity of wind power and photovoltaic power generation according to the existing methods, and this will be used as the basis for formulating the minimum guaranteed utilization hours of wind power and photovoltaic power generation in each province; (2) Wind power and photovoltaic power generation outside the proportion participate in market transactions. 5. Accelerate the reform of the electricity market and release the competitive advantages of wind power and photovoltaic power generation. The effective operation of the electricity market is an important guarantee for the development of wind power and photovoltaic power generation and the consumption of intermittent unstable electricity. We suggest: (1) first coordinate and promote the central government to break down the inter-provincial barriers to electricity market transactions, establish a unified electricity trading market on a larger scale, and expand the scope of power balance and the scale of cross-provincial and cross-regional transactions; (2) Accelerate the establishment of a spot trading market for electricity, give full play to the competitive advantage of zero marginal cost of wind power and photovoltaic power generation, and promote the full consumption of wind power and photovoltaic power generation by market means; (3) Establish a transaction of peak shaving and frequency regulation auxiliary services, so that wind power and photovoltaic power generation enterprises can solve their intermittent and unstable problems by purchasing peak shaving and frequency regulation auxiliary services from other power sources. 6. Be cautious about quota systems for non-hydro renewable energy. In the context of the severe segmentation of the electricity market and the difficulty of cross-provincial consumption of wind power and photovoltaic power generation, relevant policy makers hope to introduce a provincial-based renewable energy quota system as soon as possible to promote the cross-provincial purchase and sale of wind power and photovoltaic power generation. However, we believe that the current conditions for a quota system for non-hydro renewable energy are not yet ripe. First, renewable energy quotas and feed-in tariffs represent quantity control policies and price control policies, respectively, and the two policies cannot be implemented at the same time, otherwise the market cannot be cleared. Second, as long as the power generation right is in the hands of the provincial government, hastily promoting the renewable energy quota system and placing the obligation to complete the quota on the power generation enterprises may not break down inter-provincial barriers and promote the cross-provincial purchase and sale of wind power and photovoltaic power generation as the original intention of the policy design intended. Finally, if quotas for non-hydro renewable energy must be implemented, they should also be piloted in areas where conditions are ripe. In particular, the five provinces and cities of Hebei, Henan, Beijing, Tianjin and Shandong are not only the most serious areas of air pollution in China, but also geographically adjacent and the most qualified to become pilot areas for the non-hydro renewable energy quota system. We believe that under the premise of fully respecting the law of industrial development, formulating steady and pragmatic subsidy policies is an important guarantee for the sustainable development of wind power and photovoltaic power generation. With the advancement of technology and the continuous reduction of costs, wind power and photovoltaic power generation will eventually get rid of subsidies and gain a place in the power generation market with cost advantages. We believe that as long as we can adhere to the reform principle proposed by the Third Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China since the comprehensive deepening of reform, restore the attributes of energy commodities and let the market play a decisive role in resource allocation, and based on the original environmental intention of developing wind power and photovoltaic power generation, under the current new economic and environmental situation, seek truth from facts, reformulate appropriate subsidy policies, and vigorously promote the reform of electricity marketization, China's wind power and photovoltaic power generation will surely achieve long-term sustainable development and become an important part of China's power generation field.(AI翻译)

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GB/T 7714-2015 格式引文
王敏,徐晋涛,黄滢,谢伦裕.中国风电和光伏发电补贴政策研究[M].北京:中国社会科学出版社,2018
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MLA 格式引文
王敏,徐晋涛,黄滢,谢伦裕.中国风电和光伏发电补贴政策研究.北京,中国社会科学出版社:2018E-book.
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APA 格式引文
王敏,徐晋涛,黄滢和谢伦裕(2018).中国风电和光伏发电补贴政策研究.北京:中国社会科学出版社
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