李扬本书的缘起2007年3月全球金融危机发生以来，“全球经济失衡”无疑是被各国当局使用最多的词汇之一。发达经济体特别是美国偏爱用之来解释此次危机的根源。将危机归为失衡，将失衡描述为“全球”的，他们便得以轻松地将危机的责任推卸到其他国家，特别是像中国这样的发展中经济体头上。可以说，“中国责任论”、“中国威胁论”云云，都是从这个概念中获得其理论支持的。中国的有关部门自然对此论保持了高度的戒备。在所有的公开场合，特别是在国际会议上，官方都避免使用这个词汇。有朋友告诉我，在历次二十国集团峰会上，中国政府代表团的重要任务之一，就是在会议的公报和首脑宣言中抹去这个用语和相关表述。我们理解有关部门的这个避讳。但是，作为经济学家，心里总觉得如此避讳似乎是杯弓蛇影，甚至迹近掩耳盗铃。平心而论，一方面，除去失衡，我们似乎还很难为危机找到更合适的根源;另一方面，承认失衡是根源，绝不意味着我们接受某些国家“东引”来的“祸水”，承认失衡是我们的责任。相反，认真研究失衡问题，在国际上，我们正可据以深刻揭示某些发达国家造成失衡并引发全球危机的事实;在国内，也有助于更清楚地认识我们发展道路偏颇、经济结构失调且多年难以调整的深刻原因。2009年年初，我在伦敦参加了由温家宝总理和时任英国首相布莱尔在唐宁街10号共同主持的全球经济学家座谈会。包括斯蒂格利茨在内的20余名全球大牌经济学家与会。我是唯一的中国学者。座谈会安排了5位经济学家发言，我是其中之一。在向总理汇报并获同意之后，我在会上专门阐述了对全球失衡的看法，要点有四:其一，失衡问题虽只在近年才引起世人关注，但作为一种全球化的伴生现象，则自布雷顿森林体系建立以来便已存在。其二，观察布雷顿森林体系建立以来的全球经济发展脉络便能清晰地看到:美国作为唯一的超级大国，始终居于失衡的逆差一方;在失衡的顺差一方，不断变化的角色包括德国和日本，自70年代以后，先是亚洲“四小龙”，继而是亚洲“四小虎”，然后才是中国和石油输出国，渐次加入了该行列。因此，如果说全球失衡是此次危机的根源，那么，最重要的根源在美国那里。其三，在全球化的世界中，若称全球失衡，则世界各国的国内经济也一定是失衡的。因此，克服危机、促使经济回归正常轨道的要义，在于世界各国均致力于调整其国内的经济发展方式和经济结构;由于当前的全球化是发达经济体主导的，他们显然应承担最重要的主导性责任。其四，中国政府自20世纪末开始便已提出转变经济发展方式、调整国内经济结构、实施科学发展的战略目标，力求减少经济增长对外部需求和国内投资的过度依赖。这是实现全球经济“再平衡”的切实步骤。从会上和会后的评论来看，我的意见获得了与会者的广泛尊重。那次会议之后，全球失衡和再平衡问题便成为我的研究重点之一。上述四点看法，构成了本书的主要观点。均衡与平衡失衡与再平衡这一对概念虽然总被西方政要挂在嘴上，但是，其中“衡”的具体含义，却总是语焉不详。要深入从理论和实践上探讨如此重大的问题，就不能不先对“衡”的含义做一番推敲。失衡与再平衡中涉及的“衡”，主要有均衡(equilibrium)与平衡(balance)两种含义。平衡是一个被广泛使用的概念。根据《现代汉语词典》的解释，它指的是“对立的各方面在数量和质量上相等或相抵”。“均衡”一词来自物理学，指的是由于受到大小相同但作用相反的两种力的作用而使物体处于一种相对静止的状态。引申到经济学中，均衡是指市场上存在需求与供给这两种相反的力量，当需求恰好等于供给时，市场就会处于一种均衡状态。深入一步，经济学所说的均衡有两种情况:一种是瓦尔拉斯均衡，它强调的是市场供求相等，进而强调了市场出清。另一种为非瓦尔拉斯均衡。它强调价格机制并不能发挥出清市场的作用，市场均衡常常是非瓦尔拉斯式的，即供求未必相等，但却出现相对稳定的趋势。很显然，与供求相等的瓦尔拉斯均衡概念相比，非瓦尔拉斯均衡是一种广义的均衡概念，它指的是系统中的各个变量经过调整以后不再具有变动的趋势。非瓦尔拉斯均衡还可以有进一步的延伸，即当有外力使均衡状态偏离均衡点时，仍有一种内在倾向使经济回复到均衡状态。这是一种稳定均衡。相反，如果说外力使均衡状态偏离均衡点时，经济不再能回复到均衡状态，那就是一种不稳定均衡。显然，在经济学中，均衡与平衡是含义完全不同的两个词。均衡是标准的经济学术语，并始终是经济学家讨论的重要概念。平衡的内涵则相对贫乏，也缺乏非常严格的定义，在很多情况下，平衡还用来指余额，指的是供给和需求、资产和负债等在规模上完全相同的情况。我们要讨论的全球经济失衡中的“衡”，显然出自均衡，因为我们并不特别关注各国国际收支是否存在正的或负的差额。相反，各国存在差额是一种常态，包括贸易顺差与逆差的失衡，进一步则是经常账户的失衡，再到国际收支的失衡，最后归根结底是全球储蓄与投资的失衡，即主要发达经济体储蓄不足，而一些新兴经济体储蓄“过剩”，等等。我们关注的是，这种存在差额的状态是否能够持续。“好的失衡”与“坏的失衡”一国对外贸易或国际收支出现差额(逆差或顺差)，是该国跨越国境，在全球范围内进行资源配置的结果。因此，判断失衡的经济意义，要从资源动态配置的角度进行分析。据此，我们可以将经常项目失衡区分为“好的失衡”和“坏的失衡”两种情况。“好的失衡”是一国在一个较长时期内配置消费和投资的最优决策，例如，经常项目逆差可以是动态的前瞻性储蓄投资决策的最优化结果。这种失衡非但无害，而且还可以达到增加社会福利的效果。具体来看，“好的失衡”至少指的是如下三种状况中的一种:其一，对外失衡状况及其增减动态，恰好与本国经济发展阶段的周期变化相一致。其二，本国经济结构基础良好，企业充满活力，宏观经济具有明朗的发展前景。在这些条件下，失衡现象出现，是国内经济主体优化选择所致，势必导致良好的经济结果。其三，吸收外资的期限结构和区域结构良好。因为，经常项目长期失衡，不可避免地会对资本和金融项目产生对应性影响。倘若资本和金融项目的期限结构和区域结构合理，就会大大提高在经常项目失衡(逆差或顺差)恶化的情况下承受国际资本冲击的能力，并保持国际收支总体均衡状态的稳定。“坏的失衡”指的是，一国在利用国内外资源过程中，难以实现长期最优配置，导致经常项目失衡持续向逆差或顺差的单方向上扩大，造成经济结构扭曲，总体风险上升。其主要表现是:其一，国内经济结构失衡，即产业结构不合理、部门结构不合理、出口导向型战略未能及时调整等;其二，金融结构不完善，包括不合理的储蓄行为、不当的贷款活动、金融监管缺失、本币定值过高等;其三，资本频繁流动，导致外部风险上升，并使得原已存在的不合理对外债务结构在币种上和期限配对方面更加扭曲，外汇储备不足或者过度增长。需要指出的是，顺差并不必然意味着“好的失衡”，同样，逆差并不必然意味着“坏的失衡”。因为，顺差和逆差的出现，都意味着一国难以在本国范围内实现资源的有效配置，必须仰赖国际市场予以平衡，因而，跨境配置能力高低，是决定失衡状况好坏的决定因素。另外，失衡同时意味着资本与金融项目长期出现单方向国际资本流动，这将对国内金融体系产生持续性冲击。如果国内金融市场效率不高，这种持续性冲击将会通过汇率、利率、国际储备、信贷、债券等各类市场，对国内实体经济产生不利影响;同时，长期面对一种趋势，国内货币政策事实上处于被“绑架”的境地。若无运行良好的货币政策结构以及经验丰富的货币当局，货币政策的效力将持续降低。失衡的可持续性既然我们从均衡的概念来讨论失衡与再平衡，失衡的可持续性便是一个核心问题。事实上，前文所论“好的失衡”，就是一种可持续的失衡，因为处于失衡状态的国家实体经济健康，微观主体充满活力，发展前景明朗。在本质上，全球经济失衡是实体经济现象。然而，若无货币的介入，在“纯”实体经济体系中，任何失衡都无以产生。因为，“以物易物”的交换方式，本身就未留出发生贸易差额的任何空间。国际货币体系因素的介入，不仅使得失衡有了可能，而且使得全球失衡问题变得高度复杂化。如果全球失衡中居于逆差地位的国家可以使用其本币进行清偿和支付，则失衡在相当程度上和在相当长时期内具有可持续性。如此，对全球失衡问题的争论，重点便不在于失衡的原因和规模，等等，而在于失衡可否持续:如果世界仍然接受逆差国用其本国货币来支付逆差，则失衡便具有可持续性;反之，失衡便会引发全球经济危机。证之以布雷顿森林体系的历史，我们可以大致把握失衡的这种从可持续到不可持续转换的轨迹。从建立之初，布雷顿森林体系覆盖的经济世界便是一个失衡的世界。起初的基本格局是，美国贸易顺差和其他国家贸易逆差相互对应并长期存在。1960年，以美国的对外债务超过其黄金储备为标志，布雷顿森林世界经济失衡的格局，开始转变为美国的贸易逆差和其他国家对美贸易顺差相对应，并愈演愈烈。但是，直至20世纪60年代末，这种失衡仍然是可持续的。这是因为，美元在布雷顿森林体系中居于核心地位，因而美国享有用发行本币来弥补经常项目差额的特权——而无论欢迎与否，世界各国都必须接受美元。1971年发生的“尼克松冲击”可谓是转向不可持续的关节点。从那时开始，美国国内的物价飙升和美元的对外价值一泻千里，使得美国和世界其他国家同时感到维持美元本位已经得不偿失，于是爆发了持续近十年的全球金融危机，并导致布雷顿森林体系最终崩坏。但是，美元的故事并未结束。布雷顿森林体系作为一种制度寿终正寝后，美元作为国际储备货币的核心地位固然受到了以欧元为代表的多种新兴储备货币的严峻挑战，然而，亚洲各国的相继崛起，客观上弱化了这种挑战。由于亚洲国家的货币绝大多数与美元保持密切联系，很多国家甚至实行盯住美元的固定汇率制，该区域作为美元的新“外围”的崛起，事实上重建了以美元为中心的国际货币体系，强化了美元霸权。美元在国际货币体系中的核心地位，更因前苏联东欧国家“剧变”得以进一步巩固。90年代之前，苏联东欧集团事实上组成了一个同布雷顿森林体系相并行的国际货币体系，其关键货币是卢布。苏东剧变之后，集团内的所有国家都实行了市场经济，其货币也不约而同地奉美元为新宗主。规模如此之大的经济体集体“投诚”，无疑为美元的货币中心地位提供了新的支持。如此等等的发展，致使一些研究者径直将《牙买加协议》之后的国际货币制度称作“布雷顿森林体系Ⅱ”。我们以为，若就美国依然享受主要储备货币发行特权这一事实而论，称之“布雷顿森林体系Ⅱ”，固然地未尝不可，然而，若就美国在该体系内应承担的国际责任而论，体系Ⅰ、Ⅱ可就大异其趣了。如今，美国完全没有要为全球经济再平衡和全球经济发展承担责任的约束和压力，更遑论要为恢复全球经济再平衡付出调整成本了。我们以为，这种权利和责任的完全脱离，正构成当今国际货币制度的基本矛盾。这使得美国的货币政策可以无约束地仅仅立足于其国内目标，而全然不顾其他国家洪水滔天。也正因为存在这种基本矛盾，改革国际货币体系才成为全球经济再平衡的关键所在。走向新均衡全球经济失衡是当今世界的头号难题，努力实现再平衡自然成为当今世界的头号任务，这是因为，始自2007年、至今仍在肆虐的全球金融危机，就因全球失衡而引发。如果说危机的一般意义就是“脱离了常轨”，那么，所谓危机的恢复便可能有两种前程:一是回归旧轨;二是另辟蹊径。规模较小且涉及浅表的危机，经历了一段时期的荡涤，在那些导致脱轨的因素被修复或矫正之后，通常都会回归原轨，继续前行;而若危机在深层次上触及了体制机制，并且有新的强大因素介入经济的运行过程，则恢复的过程将走上新途。此次危机显然是后者，因为，危机爆发后，全球经济呈现出两个重要的趋势性转变，这可能会使得此次危机成为一个新的全球格局的开端。其一，发生在实体经济领域。20世纪80年代末以来，新兴经济体在全球产出中的增量贡献就一直高于发达经济体。危机以后，一方面发达经济体长期低迷;另一方面新兴经济体的持续高增长，更成为不可移转的长期趋势。在这个此长彼消的历史过程中，新兴经济体将逐渐发挥引领全球发展的作用，完全由发达经济体主导的旧的全球化模式将被改变。其二，发生在金融领域。资本主义式的全球经济危机总有金融危机相伴随，而历来的全球性金融危机，大都以发展中国家和新兴市场经济国家的债务危机为基本特征。因此，危机的恢复意味着全球性债务重组，而每一次重组，均使得发达经济体在国际金融领域中的霸主地位进一步巩固和强化。这一次完全不同了。如今深陷债务危机而难以自拔的，是那些掌握着国际储备货币发行权和国际规则制定权的发达经济体。他们被自己呼唤出来的恶魔缠身，非有新兴经济体的援手不能解脱，于是就有了如二十国集团之类的新的国际协调机制产生。自然的，危机的恢复，一方面将提升新兴经济体在国际金融领域中的话语权和影响力，促使国际储备货币体系向着多元化方向的进一步发展;另一方面则意味着发达经济体在国际金融规则制定中的决定权被逐渐弱化。正是基于上述意义，全球经济的新格局开始酝酿。也正是在这种趋势性转变中，重建新均衡以及中国的发展有了新的机遇。首先，当前世界经济进入了结构调整期和产业转型期，这将有利于中国培育“发展新优势”和“抢占未来发展战略制高点”。其次，全球“新兴市场国家力量步入上升期”和世界经济处于“治理机制变革期”，中国可以一方面努力发展壮大自己，另一方面努力增强全球治理的参与能力。如果说，全球产业转型、结构调整甚至治理变革，基本上是几十年来一次，已经成为世界经济周期性变化的一个常态，那么，新兴经济体能够真正在经济总量上赶超发达经济体，却是自工业革命以来的新变化和新机遇。对中国而言，则更可能是千年一遇的机会。不过，能否抓住这样的机遇，从而在全球达成新均衡的过程中确立自身的位置，却要看我们的发展方式能否成功地实现转型，要看我们的经济结构能否得到有效调整，要看我们的经济效率能否持续提升，要看我们的质量能否有效提高。这是我们面临的真正挑战。最后，要特别感谢汤铎铎、李成、常欣、王佳和匡可可在本书形成中作出的贡献，感谢中国社会科学出版社社长兼总编辑赵剑英等出版社的同志为本书出版付出的辛勤劳动。

Since the global financial crisis in March 2007, "global economic imbalance" has undoubtedly been one of the most used words by various authorities. Advanced economies, especially the United States, prefer to use it to explain the root causes of the crisis. By classifying the crisis as imbalances and describing them as "global," they can easily shift the blame for the crisis to other countries, especially developing economies like China. It can be said that the "China responsibility theory" and the "China threat theory" have all received their theoretical support from this concept. Naturally, the relevant departments in China have maintained a high degree of vigilance against this theory. The term is avoided in all public places, especially at international conferences. A friend told me that one of the important tasks of the Chinese government delegation at the G20 summits was to erase this term and related expressions from the communiqué and summit declaration of the meeting. We understand this evasion by the relevant authorities. However, as an economist, I always feel that such avoidance seems to be a snake shadow, and even close to stealing the bell. To be fair, on the one hand, apart from imbalances, it seems difficult to find a more appropriate source of the crisis; On the other hand, acknowledging imbalance as the root cause in no way means that we accept the "troubled waters" "brought in" by certain countries, and that it is our responsibility to admit imbalance. On the contrary, by carefully studying the problem of imbalances, we can deeply reveal the facts of imbalances caused by certain developed countries and triggered global crises at the international level; At home, it will also help to have a clearer understanding of the profound reasons for our biased development path, economic structural imbalance and difficulty in adjusting for many years. In early 2009, I attended a symposium of global economists in London, co-chaired by Premier Wen Jiabao and then-British Prime Minister Tony Blair at 10 Downing Street. More than 20 of the world's biggest economists, including Stiglitz, attended the meeting. I am the only Chinese scholar. I was one of five economists who spoke at the symposium. After reporting to and agreeing to the Prime Minister, I devoted my views on global imbalances at the meeting to four main points: First, imbalances, although they have only attracted attention in recent years, have existed as a concomitant of globalization since the establishment of the Bretton Woods institutions. Second, observing the global economic development since the establishment of the Bretton Woods system, we can clearly see that the United States, as the only superpower, has always been on the side of the imbalance deficit; On the side of the imbalanced surplus, the changing roles include Germany and Japan, which since the 70s have been joined by the Asian "Four Tigers", then the Asian "Four Tigers", and then China and the oil exporting countries. So if global imbalances are at the root of this crisis, the most important one is in the United States. Third, in a globalized world, if it is called a global imbalance, the domestic economies of all countries in the world must also be unbalanced. Therefore, the essence of overcoming the crisis and returning the economy to normal track lies in the efforts of all countries in the world to adjust their domestic economic development patterns and economic structures; Since the current globalization is dominated by advanced economies, it is clear that they bear the most important leading responsibility. Fourth, since the end of the 20th century, the Chinese government has put forward the strategic goals of transforming the mode of economic development, adjusting the domestic economic structure, and implementing scientific development, striving to reduce the excessive dependence of economic growth on external demand and domestic investment. This is a practical step towards achieving a "rebalance" of the global economy. Judging from the comments made at the meeting and after the meeting, my views were widely respected by the participants. Since that conference, the issue of global imbalances and rebalancing has become one of my research priorities. The above four points constitute the main points of this book. Although the concepts of equilibrium and balance imbalance and rebalancing are always talked about by Western politicians, the specific meaning of "balance" is always vague. In order to deeply explore such a major issue in theory and practice, we cannot fail to first make some scrutiny of the meaning of "balance." The "balance" involved in imbalance and rebalancing mainly has two meanings: equilibrium and balance. Balance is a widely used concept. According to the Modern Chinese Dictionary, it refers to "opposing aspects equal or offset in quantity and quality." The term "equilibrium" comes from physics and refers to the fact that an object is left in a state of relative rest as a result of being subjected to two forces of the same magnitude but acting on opposite effects. Extended to economics, equilibrium means that there are two opposite forces in the market, demand and supply, and when demand is exactly equal to supply, the market will be in an equilibrium state. Going further, there are two situations in what economics calls equilibrium: one is the Walras equilibrium, which emphasizes the equality of market supply and demand, and then emphasizes market clearance. The other is non-Walras equilibrium. It emphasizes that the price mechanism does not play the role of clearing the market, and the market equilibrium is often non-Walrasian, that is, supply and demand are not necessarily equal, but there is a relatively stable trend. Obviously, compared with the concept of Walras equilibrium with equal supply and demand, non-Walras equilibrium is a broad equilibrium concept, which means that the variables in the system are adjusted and no longer have a tendency to change. Non-Walras equilibrium can also be further extended, that is, when there is an external force that deviates the equilibrium state from the equilibrium point, there is still an inherent tendency to return the economy to the equilibrium state. This is a stable equilibrium. On the contrary, if the economy can no longer return to equilibrium when external forces deviate the equilibrium state from the equilibrium point, it is an unstable equilibrium. Obviously, in economics, equilibrium and equilibrium are two words with completely different meanings. Equilibrium is standard economic terminology and has always been an important concept discussed by economists. Balance is relatively poor and lacks a very strict definition, and in many cases balance is also used to refer to balances, which refer to situations where supply and demand, assets and liabilities, etc. are exactly the same size. The "balance" in the global imbalance that we are talking about is clearly out of equilibrium, because we are not particularly concerned with whether there is a positive or negative balance of payments between countries. On the contrary, the existence of differences between countries is the norm, including the imbalance of trade surpluses and deficits, further the imbalance of the current account, then the imbalance of the balance of payments, and finally the imbalance of global savings and investment, that is, the major developed economies do not save enough, while some emerging economies save "excess", and so on. Our concern is whether this state of disparity can be sustained. "Good imbalance" and "bad imbalance" The difference (deficit or surplus) in a country's foreign trade or balance of payments is the result of the country's global allocation of resources across national borders. Therefore, to judge the economic significance of imbalance, we should analyze it from the perspective of dynamic allocation of resources. Accordingly, we can distinguish between "good imbalances" and "bad imbalances". "Good imbalances" are the optimal decisions of a country to allocate consumption and investment over a longer period of time, for example, a current account deficit can be the optimal result of a dynamic forward-looking savings investment decision. Such imbalances are not only harmless, but also have the effect of increasing social welfare. Specifically, "good imbalance" refers to at least one of the following three conditions: First, the external imbalance and its increase and decrease dynamics coincide with the cyclical changes in the country's economic development stage. Second, the country's economic structure is well-established, enterprises are full of vitality, and the macroeconomy has clear development prospects. Under these conditions, imbalance occurs because of the optimal choice of domestic economic agents, which is bound to lead to good economic results. Third, the term structure and regional structure of foreign investment absorption are good. This is because long-term imbalances in the current account will inevitably have a corresponding impact on capital and financial accounts. If the term structure and regional structure of capital and financial accounts are reasonable, the ability to withstand international capital shocks in the event of worsening current account imbalances (deficits or surpluses) will be greatly enhanced, and the overall balance of payments balance of payments will be stable. "Bad imbalance" refers to the fact that in the process of using domestic and foreign resources, it is difficult for a country to achieve long-term optimal allocation, resulting in the current account imbalance continuing to expand in one direction of deficit or surplus, resulting in distortion of the economic structure and an increase in overall risk. Its main manifestations are: first, the imbalance of the domestic economic structure, that is, the unreasonable industrial structure, the unreasonable sectoral structure, and the failure of timely adjustment of export-oriented strategies; Second, the financial structure is imperfect, including unreasonable saving behavior, improper lending activities, lack of financial supervision, and excessive valuation of local currency; Third, the frequent flow of capital leads to an increase in external risks, and makes the existing unreasonable external debt structure more distorted in terms of currency and maturity matching, and foreign exchange reserves are insufficient or excessively increased. It should be noted that a surplus does not necessarily mean a "good imbalance", just as a deficit does not necessarily mean a "bad imbalance". Because the emergence of surpluses and deficits means that it is difficult for a country to achieve effective allocation of resources within its own scope, and must rely on the international market to balance, therefore, the level of cross-border allocation capacity is the determining factor that determines the imbalance. In addition, imbalances also imply long-term unidirectional international capital flows between capital and financial projects, which will have a lasting impact on the domestic financial system. If the domestic financial market is not efficient, this sustained shock will adversely affect the domestic real economy through various markets such as exchange rates, interest rates, international reserves, credit, bonds, etc. At the same time, in the long-term face of a trend, domestic monetary policy is in fact in a situation of "kidnapping". Without a well-functioning monetary policy structure and an experienced monetary authority, monetary policy will continue to be less effective. The sustainability of imbalances Since we discuss imbalances and rebalancing from the concept of equilibrium, the sustainability of imbalances is a central issue. In fact, the "good imbalance" mentioned above is a sustainable imbalance, because the real economy of the country in the imbalance state is healthy, the micro subjects are full of vitality, and the development prospects are clear. In essence, global economic imbalances are real economic phenomena. However, without the intervention of money, no imbalances can occur in a "pure" real economy. Because the "barter" method of exchange itself does not leave any room for the occurrence of trade balances. The intervention of factors in the international monetary system not only makes imbalances possible, but also highly complicates the problem of global imbalances. If countries in deficit in global imbalances can use their own currencies to settle and pay, imbalances are sustainable to a considerable extent and for a considerable period of time. In this way, the debate over global imbalances focuses not on the causes and magnitude of them, etc., but on whether they are sustainable: if the world still accepts deficit countries to pay for deficits in their own currencies, imbalances are sustainable; Conversely, imbalances can trigger a global economic crisis. Judging by the history of the Bretton Woods system, we can roughly grasp the trajectory of this shift from sustainable to unsustainable imbalance. From the very beginning, the economic world covered by the Bretton Woods system was an unbalanced world. The basic pattern at the beginning was that the U.S. trade surplus and the trade deficit of other countries corresponded to each other and persisted for a long time. In 1960, marked by the fact that the external debt of the United States exceeded its gold reserves, the pattern of world economic imbalance in Bretton Woods began to change into a trade deficit in the United States corresponding to the trade surplus of other countries with the United States, and it intensified. However, this imbalance remained sustainable until the end of the 60s of the 20th century. This is because the dollar is at the heart of the Bretton Woods system, so the United States has the privilege of issuing its own currency to cover the current account balance – and the world must accept the dollar whether it is welcomed or not. The Nixon shock of 1971 was a turning point for unsustainable efforts. Since then, soaring domestic prices in the United States and the collapse of the dollar's external value have made both the United States and the rest of the world feel that maintaining the dollar standard is not worth the cost, leading to the global financial crisis that lasted for nearly a decade and the final collapse of the Bretton Woods system. However, the story of the dollar is not over. After the end of the Bretton Woods system as a system, the core position of the US dollar as an international reserve currency was severely challenged by a variety of emerging reserve currencies represented by the euro, but the rise of Asian countries objectively weakened this challenge. Since the vast majority of Asian countries' currencies remain closely linked to the US dollar, and many countries even implement a fixed exchange rate system pegged to the US dollar, the rise of the region as the new "periphery" of the US dollar has in fact rebuilt the international monetary system centered on the US dollar and strengthened the hegemony of the US dollar. The central position of the US dollar in the international monetary system has been further consolidated by the "drastic changes" in the former Soviet Union and Eastern European countries. Before the 90s, the Soviet bloc in Eastern Europe effectively formed an international monetary system parallel to the Bretton Woods system, the key currency of which was the ruble. After the drastic changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, all countries in the bloc implemented a market economy, and their currencies invariably adopted the US dollar as the new suzerainty. The collective "surrender" of such a large economy undoubtedly provides new support for the dollar's monetary centrality. These developments have led some researchers to refer to the post-Jamaica international monetary system as "Bretton Woods II". We believe that if the United States still enjoys the privilege of issuing major reserve currencies, it is certainly not impossible to call it "Bretton Woods II", but in terms of the international responsibility of the United States within the system, systems I and II are very different. Today, the United States has no constraints and pressures to take responsibility for global economic rebalancing and global economic development, let alone to pay adjustment costs for rebalancing the global economy. We believe that this complete separation of rights and responsibilities constitutes the basic contradiction of today's international monetary system. This allows U.S. monetary policy to be unfettered and based solely on its domestic goals, regardless of the floods of other countries. It is precisely because of this fundamental contradiction that reform of the international monetary system has become the key to rebalancing the global economy. Striving to achieve rebalancing is naturally the number one task in today's world, because the global financial crisis, which began in 2007 and is still raging, was triggered by global imbalances. If the general meaning of the crisis is "out of the normal track", then the so-called recovery of the crisis may have two prospects: one is to return to the old track; The second is to find a different way. Small-scale and superficial crises have undergone a period of turmoil, and after the factors that led to the derailment have been repaired or corrected, they usually return to the original track and continue to move forward; And if the crisis touches on the institutional mechanisms at a deep level, and new powerful factors intervene in the operation of the economy, the process of recovery will embark on a new path. The crisis is clearly the latter, because the global economy has undergone two important trend shifts since the crisis, which could make the crisis the beginning of a new global landscape. First, it occurs in the real economy. Since the late 80s of the 20th century, the incremental contribution of emerging economies to global output has been higher than that of advanced economies. After the crisis, on the one hand, developed economies have been in a long-term downturn; On the other hand, the sustained high growth of emerging economies has become an irreversible long-term trend. In this historical process, emerging economies will gradually play a leading role in global development, and the old model of globalization, which is completely dominated by developed economies, will be changed. Second, it happens in the financial field. Capitalist global economic crises are always accompanied by financial crises, and most of the historical global financial crises have been characterized by debt crises in developing countries and emerging market economies. Therefore, the recovery from the crisis means a global debt restructuring, and each restructuring has further consolidated and strengthened the hegemony of developed economies in the international financial arena. This time is completely different. Caught in the debt crisis today are those advanced economies that hold the right to issue international reserve currencies and make international rules. They are haunted by the demons they have called out, and cannot be freed without the help of emerging economies, so new international coordination mechanisms such as the G20 have emerged. Naturally, the recovery of the crisis will, on the one hand, enhance the discourse power and influence of emerging economies in the international financial field, and promote the further development of the international reserve monetary system in the direction of diversification; On the other hand, it means that the decision-making power of advanced economies in international financial rule-making has gradually weakened. It is based on the above significance that a new pattern of the global economy has begun to brew. It is precisely in this trend shift that new opportunities for the re-establishment of a new equilibrium and China's development have been created. First of all, the current world economy has entered a period of structural adjustment and industrial transformation, which will help China cultivate "new advantages in development" and "seize the commanding heights of future development strategy". Second, with the global "rising strength of emerging market countries" and the world economy in a "period of governance mechanism change", China can strive to develop and strengthen itself on the one hand, and enhance its ability to participate in global governance on the other hand. If global industrial transformation, structural adjustment and even governance change are basically once in decades and have become a normal pattern of cyclical changes in the world economy, then emerging economies can truly catch up with developed economies in economic aggregate, but it is a new change and new opportunity since the industrial revolution. For China, it is more likely to be a once-in-a-millennium opportunity. However, whether we can seize such an opportunity to establish ourselves in the process of achieving a new global equilibrium depends on whether our development model can be successfully transformed, whether our economic structure can be effectively adjusted, whether our economic efficiency can be continuously improved, and whether our quality can be effectively improved. This is the real challenge we face. Finally, I would like to express special thanks to Tang Duoduo, Li Cheng, Chang Xin, Wang Jia, and Kuang Keke for their contributions in the formation of this book, and Zhao Jianying, president and editor-in-chief of China Social Sciences Press, and other comrades of the publishing house for their hard work in publishing this book.（AI翻译）