本书的讨论目标是为非还原的物理主义立场进行辩护。该立场既遵循物理主义的基本原则，又试图维护心灵属性不可还原的本体论地位。然而，该立场面临着严峻的挑战，即还原的物理主义学者从因果层面入手，说明心灵因果性可以被还原为物理因果性，从而间接论证心灵属性的可还原性。针对这一挑战，非还原的物理主义学者们也开始转而维护心灵因果性的不可还原性，即，心灵属性具有独特的、专属于自身的因果作用力，不能被物理属性的因果作用力所替代。

还原的物理主义者金在权提出了著名的排斥论证，该论证声称，非还原的物理主义立场无法同时维护心灵的不可还原性和心灵因果性。这是由于非还原的物理主义所秉持的五个前提存在理论不兼容的问题。金在权的结论是，非还原的物理主义者要么倒向还原论，要么倒向副现象论。

为了反驳该论证，非还原的物理主义者一方面反击金在权的论证本身，例如本书在第二章中详细论述的有关非过决定状况的讨论。通过这一讨论，我们可以看出金在权所提到的五个前提并非先天具有不兼容性，因为过决定状况在心灵因果性问题上有其特殊的、不同于一般过决定状况的地方。

另一方面，非还原的物理主义者努力寻找适当的因果理论，直接证明不可还原的心灵因果力，为了更好地说明本书为何要选用干涉主义因果论作为讨论心灵因果性的工具，笔者在第三章着重梳理了因果理论发展过程中的几个重要的派别，主要剖析了以上派别所产生的原因及其背后蕴含的因果观，并详细说明这些理论的缺陷何在，用以和干涉主义因果论进行对比。

干涉主义因果论是当下最热门、最前沿的因果理论之一，由伍德沃德系统全面地提出。笔者在第四章中阐述了干涉主义因果论的两个主要部分。一是通过干涉变量定义因果关系。该部分的理论重点在于，当我们引入干涉变量时，必须将所有可能造成误判的变量固定住，进而防止“混淆者”对因果判断进行干扰。二是用不变性概念将因果性诠释为程度概念，这一诠释与传统不同，后者容易将特殊科学中的很多科学规律排除在因果关系之外，不利于维护此类规律的合理性和科学性。因而，对因果概念的这一全新理解可以帮助我们更好地解读和研究特殊科学（尤其是心灵哲学）中的因果关系。

在第五章中，笔者首先应用干涉主义因果论第一部分的理论资源为“心—心”因果辩护。另外，笔者还试图澄清，“心—心”因果的不可还原性足以说明心灵属性具有独特的、不同于物理属性的因果作用力，继而也足以为非还原的物理主义进行辩护。或许有很多学者并不赞成这一观点，但是，笔者认为，论证负担在反对者那一方，即，为何“心—心”因果不足以维护非还原的物理主义。

接下来，在讨论“心—物”因果关系时，我们则会发现，干涉变量的定义与心物随附原则无法兼容。经过笔者的论证，我们无法排除物理变量作为“混淆者”的可能性，因而，对其进行固定的要求是不容调整的。这就说明，干涉主义因果论第一部分的理论资源不适合被用来讨论“心—物”因果，我们应该集中尝试用不变性加以讨论。

在第六章中，笔者发现，当运用不变性对“心—物”因果进行讨论时，依据不同的变量集会得出不同的结果。笔者试图指出，想要为“心—物”因果进行辩护的学者们所采用的因果模型实际上在讨论与“心—心”因果相似的因果关系，因此，其结论不能用以维护“心—物”因果。继而，学者们也不能用这种模型反对金在权的排斥论证。相比之下，论证“心—物”因果不如“物—物”因果恰当的学者们所采用的变量集更具合理性，其结论也更具说服力和有效性。

综合上述对“心—心”因果和“心—物”因果评判的结果，笔者在本书中构架出平行主义的心灵因果性框架。在此框架内，对于心灵结果而言，心灵原因是更恰当的；对于物理结果而言，物理原因则是更恰当的。笔者简要展示了这种因果层级的合理之处，并着重说明这一心灵因果性框架对于维护非还原物理主义立场的有利之处。

在过去的非还原的物理主义讨论中，学者们往往会认为心灵属性对外在物理世界的因果作用才是值得辩护的关键之处。因而，平行主义架构并不能真正地辩护非还原的物理主义立场。而笔者想要澄清的是，心灵属性依然从某种程度上对外在物理世界产生因果作用，只不过这种“心—物”的因果关系不如“物—物”的因果关系稳固和恰当。相比之下，心灵属性对心灵属性的因果效用可以更加有力地证明其因果力的不可还原性。

鉴于非还原的物理主义想要讨论的焦点在于心灵因果性的存在及非还原性问题，权衡来看，平行主义的心灵因果框架足以为非还原的物理主义辩护，因为它维护了“心—心”因果的存在和非还原性，同时维护了“心—物”因果的存在性，仅仅削弱了它的非还原性。在目前有关心灵因果性问题的框架中，笔者认为，平行主义方案是更加合理的。

关键词：干涉主义因果论；心灵因果性；混淆者；不变性；平行主义

Abstract

The goal of this book is to defend for non-reductive physicalism（NRP）.NRP follows those basic principles of physicalism and tries to support the irreducible ontology of mental property as well.However,NRP faces a serious challenge.That is,reductive physicalists,from the perspective of causality,illustrate that mental causation can be reduced to physical causation,which indirectly shows the reducibility of the mental property.Confronting this challenge,NRP turns to defend for the irreducibility of mental causation.That is,the mental property has its own distinct causal power,which cannot be substituted by that of the physical property.

Jaegwon Kim,a reductive physicalist,raised the famous“Exclusion Argument”,claiming that non-reductive physicalism cannot preserve the irreducibility of mental property and the mental causation at the same time.He argued that the five principles held by NRP remained incompatibility.His conclusion is that NRP either turns into reductionism or becomes epi-phenomenalism

To reject the exclusion argument,NRP denies Kim's argument itself on one hand,like those discussions on non-determination,which is illustrated in detail in the second chapter of this book.Through these discussions,we will find out that those five principles mentioned by Kim are not a prior incompatible since the situation of determination within mental causation is special and different from other general ones.

On the other hand,NRP tries very hard to search for an appropriate causal theory,which can directly prove that the mental causal power is irreducible.In order to better illustrate why this book chooses the interventionism theory of causation to be a tool of discussing mental causation,the author will stress on the reconstruction of several important groups in the development history of causal theory.The author mainly analyzes those groups' origins and the views of causation underlying their theories.Besides,the author will demonstrate the flaws of those theories in detail in order to compare the interventionist theory of causation with those theories.

Nowadays,the interventionist theory of causation,raised by James Woodward systematically and comprehensively,is one of the hottest and the most cutting-edge one among all the causal theories.In chapter four,the author will demonstrate two major parts of the interventionist theory of causation.One part is about using the intervention variable to define causal relation.The key point of this part is that when we bring in the intervention variable,we must make sure that all the other variables in this set are held fixed,especially those which may possibly give rise to misjudgment.Furthermore,we can prevent the causal assessment from being disturbed by“confounders”.The other part is about using the notion of invariance to make the concept of causation a concept with degree.This interpretation is totally different from that of traditional concept of causation,which is easier to exclude a plenty of scientific generalizations to be regarded as causal relation,especially the generalizations in the special sciences.This result goes against preserving those reasonable and scientific generalizations.Therefore,having a completely new understanding of the notion of causation can assist us to better interpret and study the causal relation in those special sciences,especially the philosophy of mind.

In chapter five,the author firstly use the first part of theoretical resource of the interventionist theory of causation to defend for M-M causa tion.Moreover,the author also tries to make clear that the irreducibility of M-M causation is enough to prove that the mental property has distinct and additional causal power,different from that of the physical property.And it is also adequate to defend for NRP.Maybe some scholars disagree with this point of view.However,the author thinks that the proof burden is on the shoulder of those rejecters.That is,they need to argue why M-M causation is inadequate to defend for NRP.

Next,when we discuss M-P causal relation,we will figure out that the notion of intervention variable and the principle of supervenience are incompatible.After the author's argument,we will find out that we cannot preclude the possibility of the physical variable's being a“confounder”.Thus,we cannot adjust the requirement of holding fixed the physical variable.This result shows that this part of theory is inappropriate for discussing M-P causation and we should focus on appealing to the notion of invariance to continue our discussion.

In the chapter six,the author finds out that while applying the notion of invariance to discussing M-P causation,different variable sets and causal models will lead to different results.The author wants to point out that the causal models,used by those scholars who aim at defending for the M-P causation,are actually discussing about the causal relations similar with M-M causation.As a result,the conclusion led by those causal models cannot defend for M-P causation.Furthermore,those scholars cannot use it to reject Kim's exclusion argument.By contract,the causal models,used by those scholars who argue that P-P causation is better than M-P causation,are more reasonable and the conclusion led by them is more persuasive and valid.

Combining the results of the causal judgment of M-Mand M-P causation mentioned above,the author builds up a parallelism structure for mental causation in this book.In this structure,with the respect for the mental effect,mental cause is more appropriate,meanwhile,with the respect for the physical effect,physical cause is more appropriate.Based on this structure,the author briefly illustrates the reasonability of this kind of causal hierarchy and emphasizes the advantage of this mental causation structure for defending NRP.

Within the discussion on NRP in the past,scholars always announce that what the most important part that worth defending is that the mental property has its own causal power toward the physical world outside.Due to this view,the parallel structure the author sets up cannot actually defend for NRP.But the author wants to declare that the mental property still has some causal influence upon the physical world outside to some degree.But this kind of M-P causal relation is not as stable and appropriate as the P-P causal relation.Compare to it,the mental property's causal power toward the mental property is more convincing to prove that mental causation is irreducible.

Considering that NRP focuses on preserving the existence and irreducibility of mental causation,after weighing the pres and cons,we will find out that the parallel structure of mental causation is capable of defending for NRP.The reason is that it vindicates the existence and irreducibility of M-M causation and maintains the existence of M-P causation as well.All it sacrifices is the irreducibility of M-P causation.As a result,the author thinks that by now,the parallel structure of mental causation is more reasonable among all the other causal structures.

Key Words:The Interventionism Theory of Causation; Mental Causation;Confounder;Invariance;Parallelism