本书以南矿为田野研究点，运用个案研究方法，从组织社会学的视角出发，通过对南矿包工制组织结构及其功能的分析，揭示包工制下的权益相关方——矿方、包工头和工人在包工制组织结构中的权力和地位，分析包工制的运行机制，以及由此所导致的工人权利缺位和安全生产困境。通过对包工制组织运行机制—工人权利缺位—安全生产困境相关性的建构，揭示煤炭业包工制的制度困境及其可能出路，并与包工制的相关研究进行对话，在此基础上，反思国企组织在改革开放以来的具体实践逻辑。

研究发现，组织环境形塑了包工制的变迁与发展，合法性逻辑和效率逻辑的交互作用是推动包工制形成和发展的重要因素。合法性逻辑是包工制出现的前提条件，包工制的发展则是基于效率逻辑的支配，而包工制的进一步发展则是基于合法性逻辑和效率逻辑的共同支配。

包工制内部层级分明，分工明确，其嵌入南矿后，南矿的治理结构由矿方—工人之间的关系转变为矿方—包工头—工人之间的关系。在这种治理结构下，矿方处在权力结构的顶端，居主导地位，包工头处于权力结构的中间，相对矿方呈弱势，相对工人又呈强势，工人的地位最低。首先，矿方与包工头是一种委托代理关系，包工制在两者间的运作逻辑可以概括为“双重包干”，即生产包干和安全包干；其次，在包工队内部，即包工头和工人之间，包工制的运作逻辑为生产任务的不断加码，安全责任风险的向下转移。由此，整个包工制的运作逻辑实质就是一个生产任务不断向下转移并层层加码的过程，同时也是一个安全责任风险不断向下转嫁并不断增加的过程，在这个过程中，收益与风险出现反向配置，收益呈不断上收趋势，风险却呈不断下移趋势，最终矿方获得了最大收益却承担风险最小，包工头次之，工人则是获得收益最小但承担风险最大。

包工制的这种权力利益上收与责任风险下移的运作逻辑符合了煤矿利润最大化，风险最小化的要求。包工制既能转移企业的管理责任和安全责任风险，又能转嫁企业的用工成本，还能提高企业的生产效率，满足了煤炭行业受自身环境、市场环境和政治环境等因素形塑的要求，带来了非常明显的绩效。但这种运作逻辑在带来绩效的同时也带来了诸多问题。其一，包工制的低成本运作导致工人的合法权利得不到有效保护，工人陷入“权利贫困”之中。对于这种困境，不同的工人采取了不同的行动，服从、个体表达、用脚投票、依法抗争，但不论哪种方式都没有改变这种困境。其二，包工制这种向下转移安全责任风险的运作机制引发了安全困境，即安全事故的频发不断，而“安全包干”又确保了安全事故的内部消化，从而又为新事故埋下了再生的种子，由此安全事故周而复始，陷入了恶性循环之中。

包工制的上述困境是包工制自身无法克服的，煤企的组织环境制约了包工制本身的制度化和理性化，由此在当前的组织环境下，包工制的困境也是无解的。只有当国企改革彻底完成，以及国家切实保障工人权利时，才能解决上述困境，但与西方现代化不断向科学化和理性化发展不同的是，许多国企改革选择了形式上采用科学化、理性化的现代企业制度，实质上却仍使用较为落后的生产模式，而这种奇特结合的过渡状态却被认为是企业效益最佳的选择，从而导致改革的停滞不前，这种效益实质是“低人力成本优势”的必然结果。因此只要组织环境不变，包工制也将会继续存在。

关键词：包工制；组织结构；运作机制；功能；制度困境

Abstract

This book takes South Mine as the field research location by using case study method and reveals the power and status of the stakeholders-employers,contractors and labors in the organizational structure of the labor contracting system through the analysis of the organizational structure and function of the labor contracting system of the South Mine,and analyzes the operational mechanism of the labor contracting system and the absence of labors' rights and production safety dilemma.This paper indicates the systematic dilemma and possible way of the labor contracting system in coal industry through the relevance construction of the operational mechanism of the labor contracting system-the absence of labors' rights-the production safety dilemma and conducts the dialogue with the study of the labor contracting system of the modern China,and reflects the specific practi cal logic of state-owned enterprise organization since the Reform and Opening on this basis.

The study finds that the organizational environment has shaped the transformation and development of the labor contracting system,and the interaction between the legality logic and efficiency logic is an important factor in promoting the formation and development of the labor contracting system.The logic of legality is the precondition for the emergence of the labor contracting system,and the development of the labor contracting system is based on the control of efficiency logic,and the further development of the labor contracting system is based on the joint control of the logic of legality and logic of efficiency.

The labor contracting system has a clearly hierarchy and division of labor.After its embedding in the South Mine,the governance structure of the South Mine has transformed from the relationship between the employers and labors to the relationship between the employers,contractors and labors.Under this governance structure,the employers are at the top of the power structure,occupy a dominant position,and the contractors are in the middle of the power structure.They are relatively vulnerable to the employers and relatively strong to the labors,and the status of labors is the lowest.First of all,the relationship between the employers and the contractors is a kind of principal-agent relationship,and the operational logic can be summed up as“double contracting,”that is,production contracting and safety contracting.Secondly,the operational logic of the labor contracting system between the contractors and the labors is the increasing number of production tasks and shifted downward security risks.Thus,the operational logic of the overall labor contracting system is essentially a process in which production tasks and security risks are both increasing and continuously transferred downwards.In this process,there is a negative correlation between returns and risks.Returns are concentrated upwards,but risks are continuously moving downwards.Eventually,the employers have obtained the maximum returns but undertaken the least risks,followed by contractors,and the labors have obtained the least returns but undertaken the most risks.

The operational logic of the power and interests concentrated upwards and the responsibility and risks shifting downwards is in line with the requirements of maximizing profit and minimizing risks in coal mines.The labor contracting system can not only transfer the management responsibilities and security risks of enterprises,but also transfer the labor costs and alsoimprove the production efficiency of the enterprises,and meet the coal industry's requirements shaped by its own environment,market environment and politi cal environment and can produce very clear performance.However,this operational logic brings many problems.Firstly,the low-cost operation of the labor contracting system has made labors' legal rights not in the effective protection and labors have been trapped in the rights poverty.For this dilemma,different labors have taken different actions,obeying,expressing themselves,voting with their feet,and fighting according to the law,but neither method has changed this dilemma.Although it cannot change the predicament,it has caused two unexpected consequences.The one is that the frequent movement of labors has reduced the techni cal proficiency of labors and is not conducive to the accumulation of knowledge of safe operations.In order to cope with high mobility,the contractors employ many young people with relatively low levels of education,which further hinders the improvement of safety standards and thus increased security risks.The other one is that many labors link the current living conditions and rights to more grand socialist ideologies and begin to strongly express their nostalgia for the era of traditional planned economy,and even present populist tendencies.Secondly,the operating mechanism of the downward movement of security risks of the labor contracting system has triggered a security dilemma,that is,security accidents frequently occur.The“safety contracting”has ensured the internal digestion of security accidents and thus laid the seeds for regeneration for new accidents.As a result,security incidents have been repeated and cycled into a vicious cycle.

The above-mentioned dilemma of the labor contracting system cannot be overcome by itself,and the organizational environment of the coal enterprises restricts the institutionalization and rationalization of the labor contracting system.Therefore,the dilemma of the labor contracting system is also unsolvable in the current organizational environment.Only when the reform of state-owned enterprises is fully completed and the state effectively protects the rights of labors can the above-mentioned dilemma be solved.However,unlike Western modernization,which is constantly developing toward scientific and rational development,many state-owned enterprise reforms have adopted a modern,scientific and rational corporate system in form,but still use a relatively backward production model,and this peculiar combination of the transitional state is considered to be the best choice for corporate efficiency,leading to the stagnation of the reform,and this benefit is in fact the inevitable result of“low labor cost advantage”.Therefore,as long as the organizational environment is unchanged,the labor contracting system will continue to exist.

Key Words: the Labor Contracting System; Organizational Structure; Operational Mechanism; Function; Systematic Dilemma