本书关注的是有关现象意识在自然世界中的定位问题。笔者希望通过本书的分析和讨论达到捍卫能力假说——现象判断不是命题陈述或事实知识——的目标。笔者对能力假说的辩护主要通过三个方面实现：首先，分析并揭示能力假说所面临的某些问题；其次，在此基础上对能力假说的某些方面进行发展和改良；最后，面对进一步的质疑和挑战，指出经过改良的能力假说仍然拥有其不可动摇的合理性。

能力假说以知咋和知啥的分类为基础，主体知道某种现象经验是什么样子就是掌握相应经验的分辨能力，等同于知咋的能力是非命题形式的知识，所以现象判断代表了分辨能力的展示而不是非物理的命题知识。然而，现象概念指称现象意识或现象属性，现象概念与现象意识之间具有密切关系。由于原始的能力假说没有对现象概念进行任何分析和讨论，它也不能说明有关现象概念与现象意识之间关系的本质，所以不可避免地面临了一些由现象概念所导致的问题。

原始的能力假说可以通过同一论得到有关现象概念方面的理论支持，从而克服自身存在的问题。由于刘易斯的同一论相比其他物理主义立场更具理论优势，所以笔者可以通过它为能力假说提供充分的理论支持，从而弥补原始的能力假说某些方面的理论空白。从刘易斯的同一论立场出发，笔者将分析有关能力、现象概念和现象经验三者之间的关系，使新版本的能力假说得到更好的发展和完善。

经过改良的能力假说能够更好地回应其他哲学家进一步提出的质疑和反驳。这些挑战包括来自后天物理主义立场的反对意见、关于知咋与知啥关系的争论，以及有关现象事实知识的直觉观念和必要性的论证。根据笔者的分析和讨论，这些反对意见不能对能力假说造成严重威胁，改良的能力假说是一个合理解决意识问题的理论。

关键词：现象属性；现象概念；知识论证；物理主义；能力假说

Abstract

This book addresses the problem of how to find a place for phenomenal consciousness in the natural world.My goal is to defend the Ability Hypothesis—the doctrine that phenomenal judgment is not propositional knowledge or factual knowledge.My defence of the Ability Hypothesis consists of three aspects:analyzing and uncovering the problems the Ability Hypothesis faces; developing and refining the Ability Hypothesis by overcoming these problems;suggesting that the refined Ability Hypothesis has its plausibility in front of further doubts and challenges.

The Ability Hypothesis is based on the distinction between knowledge how and knowledge-that.It claims that when we learn what an experience is like by having it,we gain abilities to remember,imagine,and recognize.According to this hypothesis,ability is knowledge -how,and it is independent of knowledge-that,to the effect that phenomenal statements represent an exhibition of ability rather than non -physical knowledge -that.However,phenomenal concepts refer to phenomenal consciousness.There is an intimate relation between phenomenal concepts and phenomenal consciousness.Since the original Ability Hypothesis does not include an account of phenomenal concepts,it leaves untouched the nature of the relationship between phenomenal concepts and phenomenal consciousness.

Because Lewis' s identity theory has more theoretical advantages than its physicalist competitors,the Ability Hypothesis can be reformulated and hence refined in a certain way.Base on Lewis' s identity theory,I will analyze the relationships between ability,phenomenal concepts and phenomenal consciousness in order to better the Ability Hypothesis.

The refined Ability Hypothesis has the virtue of responding to some further doubts and objections.These challenges include objections from a posteriori physicalism,the debates concerning the relation between knowledge-how and knowledge-that,and arguments from phenomenal knowledge-that.I argue that none of these objections present serious threats to the refined Ability Hypothesis.

Key Words:phenomenal property;phenomenal concepts;the knowledge argument;physicalism;the ability hypothesis